Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Default under Incomplete Markets by Pouzo, Demian & Presno, Ignacio
Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Default under Incomplete
Markets
Demian Pouzo and Ignacio Presno ∗
May 10, 2016
Abstract
In a dynamic economy, we characterize the fiscal policy of the government when it levies
distortionary taxes and issues defaultable bonds to finance its stochastic expenditure. De-
fault may occur in equilibrium as it prevents the government from incurring in future tax
distortions that would come along with the service of the debt. Households anticipate the
possibility of default generating endogenous credit limits. These limits hinder the govern-
ment’s ability to smooth taxes using debt, implying more volatile and less serially correlated
fiscal policies, higher borrowing costs and lower levels of indebtedness. In order to exit tem-
porary financial autarky following a default event, the government has to repay a random
fraction of the defaulted debt. We show that the optimal fiscal and renegotiation policies
have implications aligned with the data.
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1 Introduction
As originally indicated by Barro [1979], tax smoothing motives play a fundamental role in the
design of optimal fiscal policies. The possibility to smooth taxes, however, relies significantly
on the market structure for government debt. Relative to the seminal results by Lucas and
Stokey [1983] for complete markets economies, Aiyagari et al. [2002] shows that taxes typically
display higher variability and lower serial correlation under incomplete markets with sufficiently
stringent debt and asset limits. In this latter economy, the government is assumed to have
access to one-period risk-free bonds. But how are optimal tax and debt policies affected if the
government is given the option to default and restructure its debt, as we have observed several
times throughout history? In this paper we answer this question. We show how the presence of
default risk and the actual default contingency gives rise to endogenous credit limits that hinder
the government’s ability to smooth shocks using debt. As a result, taxes become even more
volatile, and less serially correlated than in the benchmark incomplete market framework.
We analyze the dynamic taxation problem of a benevolent government with access to dis-
tortionary labor taxes and non-state-contingent debt in a closed economy. We assume, however,
that the government cannot commit to pay back the debt. In case the government defaults, the
economy enters temporary financial autarky wherein it faces exogenous random offers to repay
a fraction of the defaulted debt that arrive at a given rate.1 The government has the option to
accept the offer — and thereby exit financial autarky — or to stay in financial autarky awaiting
new offers. During temporary financial autarky, the defaulted debt still has some value as a
fraction of it will be eventually repaid in the future. Hence, households can trade the defaulted
debt in a secondary market from which the government is excluded, giving rise to an equilibrium
price of the debt during the period of default. Finally, in line with the aforementioned optimal
taxation literature, we assume that the government commits itself to its optimal path of taxes
as long as the economy is not in financial autarky.
The government has three policy instruments: (1) distortionary taxes, (2) government debt,
and (3) default/repayment decisions that consist of: (a) whether to default on the outstanding
debt and (b) whether to accept the offer to exit temporary financial autarky. In order to
finance the stochastic process of expenditures, the government faces a trade-off between levying
1While in our model we allow only for outright default on government bonds, governments in practice could
liquidate the real value of the debt and repayments through inflation risk, which could be viewed as a form of
partial default. In several economies, however, this second option may not available, either because the country
has surrendered the control over its monetary policy (for example, as in the eurozone, Ecuador, and Panama), or a
significant portion of the government debt is either foreign-currency denominated, or local-currency denominated
but indexed to the CPI or a similar index. We see our environment particularly appropriate for this class of
economies.
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distortionary taxes and not defaulting, or issuing debt and thereby increasing the exposure to
default risk. Defaulting introduces some degree of state contingency on the payoff of the debt
since the financial instrument available to the government becomes an option, rather than a non-
state-contingent bond. In equilibrium, the government may optimally decide not to honor its
debt contracts —even though the bondholders are the households whose welfare it cares about—
because default would prevent the government from incurring in the future tax distortions that
would come along with the service of the debt. We believe this is a novel motive to default on
government debt which, to our knowledge, had not been explored before in the literature.
The option to default, however, does not come free of charge: in equilibrium households
anticipate the possibility of default, demanding a compensation for it embedded in the pricing
of the bond; this originates a “Laffer curve” type of pattern for the bond proceedings, thereby
implying endogenous credit limits. Two key implications follow: First, in this sense, our model
generates “debt intolerance” endogenously, in contrast with Aiyagari et al. [2002] wherein credit
limits are exogenous. Second, in our framework, these credit limits together with higher bor-
rowing costs prevent the government from completely spreading the tax burden over time, as in
the risk-free debt economy.
Our theoretical model is motivated by some observations of tax and debt dynamics along
with episodes of domestic defaults and debt restructuring throughout the history for a number
of economies. To name a few: (1) the government policies and fiscal accounts for France in
the 100 years preceding the French Revolution of 1789, wherein France defaulted recurrently
and no tax-smoothing features stand out from its debt and tax dynamics; see Sargent and
Velde [1995].2 (2) The debt restructuring plan proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton for the U.S. economy in 1790 and the policy debates around it.3 (3) Finally, several
emerging economies, where default is a recurrent event, taxes are more volatile, borrowing costs
are sizable, and indebtedness levels are significantly lower than for developed economies.4
2In contrast, time-series for Great Britain debt broadly resemble Barro’s random walk behavior. Great Britain
honored all its debt contracts through this period.
3As Hall and Sargent [2014] states, through renegotiating the U.S. debt with no discrimination scheme across
creditors, Hamilton was hoping to improve the federal government access to credit markets, which in turn would
eventually allow for lower borrowing costs to finance temporary increases in government spending and thereby
smooth out taxes. Few years later, in 1807, in his report to Congress, Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin was
advocating for a fiscal policy largely in accord with Barro’s tax smoothing idea.
4Several domestic defaults for emerging economies were also external. In any case, empirical evidence seems to
suggest that government default has a significant direct impact on domestic residents, either because a considerable
portion of the foreign debt is in the hands of local investors, or because the government also defaults on domestic
debt. For example, for Argentina’s default in 2001, about 60 percent of the defaulted debt is estimated to have
been in the hands of Argentinean residents; local pension funds alone held almost 20 percent of the total defaulted
debt. For Russia’s default in 1998 about 60 percent of the debt was held by residents. For Ukraine’s default in
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In a benchmark case, with quasi-linear utility and i.i.d. government expenditure, we charac-
terize analytically the determinants of the optimal default decision and its effects on the optimal
taxes, debt and allocations. In particular, we first show that default is more likely when the
government expenditure or debt is higher, and that the government is more likely to accept any
given offer to pay a fraction of the defaulted debt when the level of defaulted debt is lower; these
theoretical results have implications for haircuts and duration of debt restructuring processes
aligned with the data. Second, we find that prices — both outside and during financial autarky
— are non-increasing on the level of debt, thus implying that spreads are non-decreasing and
also implying the existence of endogenous borrowing limits. Third, we prove that the law of
motion of the optimal government tax policy departs from the standard martingale-type behav-
ior found in the standard incomplete market framework. Barro [1979] conjectured that optimal
debt and taxes should exhibit a random walk behavior. This result was re-affirmed by Aiyagari
et al. [2002] in a general equilibrium setup under some restrictions on asset limits. In our paper
we show how this result is altered once default risk is incorporated. More specifically, the law of
motion of the optimal government tax policy will be affected, on the one hand, by the benefit
from having more state-contingency on the payoff of the bond, but, on the other hand, by the
cost of having the option to default (manifested in higher borrowing costs).
Finally, we conduct a series of numerical exercises to assess the quantitative performance of
our model along the aforementioned dimensions.
Related Literature. A growing literature has emerged from the seminal work of Barro
[1979] highlighting the role of tax-smoothing motives in the design of optimal fiscal and debt
policy. In a partial equilibrium deterministic framework, Barro [1979] assumes that the govern-
ment needs to finance an exogenous sequence of public spending either by levying distortionary
taxes or issuing non-state-contingent debt. Barro shows that the government wants to smooth
tax distortions across periods by recurring to debt issuance to finance temporary increases in
public spending. In a stochastic environment, the model predicts a random walk response of
debt and taxes to public spending.
Lucas and Stokey [1983] shows that this result does not survive in an environment with
complete markets. In particular, in a general equilibrium setup where a Ramsey planner disposes
of distortionary labor taxes and a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities, Lucas and Stokey
[1983] proves that optimal taxes (and debt) do not follow a random walk process but roughly
inherit the stochastic properties from the government spending dynamics.
By extending Lucas and Stokey [1983] framework to incomplete markets, Aiyagari et al.
[2002] revitalizes Barro [1979] and show that the Ramsey plan prescribes a near-random walk
1997-98, residents — Ukrainian banks and the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) among others — held almost 50
percent of the outstanding stock of T-bills. See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer [2006].
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component into debt and taxes under certain conditions for asset/debt limits. Our model builds
on Aiyagari et al. [2002] by adding two key ingredients. First, we give the government the option
to default on its debt, thus endogenizing the ad hoc government credit limits imposed in Aiyagari
et al. [2002], as well as the return on government bonds. Second, in our model the government
is confronted with an exogenous debt restructuring process following a default event.
Farhi [2010] extends the setting of Aiyagari et al. [2002] by introducing capital accumulation
and letting the government to levy capital taxes in addition to labor ones. Shin [2006] studies
the Ramsey fiscal policy in an environment akin to Aiyagari et al. [2002] but with heterogeneous
households facing idiosyncratic labor risks.5 We see these papers as complementary to ours. A
recent paper by Bhandari et al. [2016] builds on Aiyagari et al. [2002] by allowing the government
to trade a single possibly risky asset. While in Bhandari et al. [2016] the asset payoff follows an
ad hoc exogenous process, in our model it is driven by the government optimal default decisions.
Our work also contributes to the literature on quantitative default models. We model the
strategic default decision of the government as in Arellano [2008] and Aguiar and Gopinath
[2006], who first adapted the theoretical framework of Eaton and Gersovitz [1981] to study
sovereign default risk and its interaction with the business cycles in emerging economies.6 From
this strand of literature, our paper is closely related to Doda [2007] and Cuadra et al. [2010].
Both papers analyze the procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries by solving an op-
timal taxation problem of a government with distortionary labor taxes and incomplete financial
markets.7 Their models, however, differ from ours along several important dimensions. First,
they consider a small open economy with foreign lenders, while we assume a closed economy.8
In our economy, bondholders are the domestic households whose welfare our benevolent gov-
ernment wants to maximize, so tax-smoothing concerns are the dominant determinant in the
decision to default or not. Second, we assume a debt restructuring process while in Doda [2007]
and Cuadra et al. [2010] the government exits autarky exempt of any repayment of the defaulted
debt. Third, these papers assume that the government cannot commit to fiscal policies, while we
do, in line with Aiyagari et al. [2002]. Finally, we address a different class of question. Instead of
5Angeletos [2002] and Buera and Nicolini [2004] study the optimal maturity structure of government debt
and show how non-contingent bonds of different maturities can be used to implement the allocations with state-
contingent debt.
6Chatterjee and Eyingungor [2012] extends this setup by incorporating long-term debt.
7Aguiar et al. [2009] also allow for default in a small open economy with capital where households do not
have access to neither financial markets nor capital and provide labor inelastically. The authors’ main focus is on
capital taxation and the debt “overhang” effect.
8From our viewpoint, little attention has been put on quantitative models with domestic default. A notable
exception is D’Erasmo and Mendoza [2015], where, in an economy with wealth inequality across domestic agents,
redistributional motives influence the incentives to default. Dovis et al. [2015] studies optimal policies for taxes,
transfers, and both domestic and external debt in an open economy with competition between political parties.
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exploring fiscal regularities in emerging economies, our work is rather centered on the normative
analysis of optimal taxation in the context of government default and provides an analytical
characterization of optimal fiscal and debt policies.
Benjamin and Wright [2009], Pitchford and Wright [2008], Yue [2010] and Bai and Zhang
[2012] propose alternative ways of modeling the entire debt restructuring process. Although our
mechanism to reach a debt settlement is not fully endogenous as theirs, it is sufficiently rich to
replicate key features of debt renegotiation episodes in the data.
We assume that the government has the ability to commit to a tax policy at any time, except
in the periods of debt renegotiation when it regains access to financial markets, in which case it
can revise and reset its fiscal policy. This assumption is to some extent similar to Debortoli and
Nunes [2010]. Debortoli and Nunes [2010] studies the dynamics of debt in a setting similar to
Lucas and Stokey [1983] but with the peculiarity that at each time t, with some given probability,
the government can lose its ability to commit to taxes and re-optimize; a feature labeled by the
authors as “loose commitment.” Thus, our model can be viewed as providing a mechanism that
“rationalizes” this probability of “loosing commitment” by allowing for endogenous default, and
resetting of fiscal policy when a debt settlement is reached.
Roadmap. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 presents the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 presents the government’s problem. Section
5 derives analytical results. Section 6 contains some numerical exercises. Section 7 briefly
concludes. All proofs are gathered in the appendices.
2 The Economy
In this section we describe the stochastic structure of the model, the timing and policies of the
government and present the household’s problem.
2.1 The Setting
Let time be indexed as t = 0, 1, .... Let (gt, δt) be the vector of government expenditure at time
t and the fraction of the defaulted debt which is to be repaid when exiting autarky, respectively.
If the economy is not in financial autarky, δt is either one or zero in order to model the option of
the government to repay the totality of the debt or to default. These are the exogenous driving
random variables of this economy. Let ωt ≡ (gt, δt) ∈ G× ∆¯, where G ⊂ R, ∆¯ ≡ ∆ ∪ {1} ∪ {δ¯}
and ∆ ⊂ [0, 1), and in order to avoid technical difficulties, we assume cardinal of G and ∆ are
finite. The set ∆ models the offers — as fractions of outstanding debt — to repay the defaulted
debt, and δ¯ is designed to capture situations where the government does not receive any offer to
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repay. For any t ∈ {1, ....,∞}, let Ωt = (G × ∆¯)t be the space of histories of exogenous shocks
up to time t; a typical element is ωt = (ω0, ω1, ..., ωt).
2.2 The Government Policies and Timing
In this economy, the government finances exogenous government expenditures by levying labor
distortionary taxes and trading one-period, discount bonds with households. The government,
however, cannot commit to repay and may default on the bonds at any point in time.
Let B ⊆ R be compact. Let Bt+1 ∈ B be the quantity of bonds issued at time t to be paid at
time t+ 1 so that Bt+1 > 0 means that the government is borrowing at time t from households.
Let τt be the linear labor tax. Also, let dt be the default decision, which takes value 1 if the
government decides to default and 0 otherwise. Finally, let at be the decision of accepting an
offer to repay the defaulted debt. It takes value 1 if the offer is accepted and 0 otherwise.
For any t, let φt be the variable that takes value 0 if at time t the government cannot
issue bonds during this period, and value 1 if it can. The implied law of motion for φt is
φt ≡ φt−1(1− dt) + (1− φt−1)at. That means that if at time t− 1, the government could issue
bonds, then φt = (1−dt), but if it was in financial autarky, then φt = at, reflecting the fact that
the government regains access to financial markets only if the government decides to renegotiate
the defaulted debt.
The timing for the government is as follows. Following a period with financial access, after
observing the current government expenditure, the government has the option to default on the
totality of the outstanding debt carried from last period, Bt.
As shown in figure 2.1, if the government exercises the option to default at time t, it cannot
issue bonds in that period and runs a balanced budget, i.e., tax revenues equal government
expenditure. At the beginning of next period, time t+1, with probability 1−λ, the government
remains in temporary financial autarky for that period (node B). With probability λ, the
government receives a random offer to repay a fraction δ of the debt, and has the option to
accept or reject it. If the government accepts the offer, it pays the restructured amount (the
outstanding defaulted debt times the fraction δ), and can issue new bonds for the following
period (node A). If the government rejects the offer, it stays in temporary autarky (node B).
Finally, if the government decides not to default, it levies distortionary labor taxes, and
allocates discount bonds to the households to cover the expenses gt and liabilities carried from
last period. Next period, it has again the option to default for the new values of outstanding
debt and government expenditure (node A).
As it will become clear later, default on bonds can be seen as a negative lump-sum transfer
to households, but a costly one. Default will turn to be costly for two reasons. First, households
anticipate the government default strategies and demand higher returns to buy the bond. Sec-
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Figure 2.1: Timing of the Model
ond, default is followed by temporary financial autarky. During autarky, the government is not
only unable to issue debt but also could be subject to an ad hoc output cost, as shown later.
We now formalize the probability model. Let piG : G → P(G) be the Markov transition
probability function for the process of government expenditures and let pi∆ ∈ P(∆) be the
probability measure over the offer space ∆.9
Assumption 2.1. For any (t, ωt), Pr(gt = g|ωt−1) = piG(g|gt−1) for any g ∈ G and
Pr(δt = δ|gt, ωt−1) =
{
1{1}(δ) if φt−1 = 1
(1− λ)1{δ¯}(δ) + λpi∆(δ) if φt−1 = 0
for any δ ∈ ∆¯.10
Essentially, this assumption imposes a Markov restriction on the probability distribution
over government expenditures and also additional restrictions over the probability of offers. In
particular, this assumption implies that in financial autarky with probability 1− λ, δ = δ¯ (i.e.,
receiving no offer) and with probability λ, an offer from the offer space is drawn according to
pi∆. Also, if φt−1 = 1 (i.e., the government was not in financial autarky at period t − 1), then
9For a finite set X, P(X) is the space of all probability measures defined over X. Also, for any A ⊆ X, the
function 1A(·) takes value 1 over the set A and 0 otherwise.
10It is easy to generalize this to a more general formulation such as λ and pi∆ depending on g. For instance, we
could allow for, say, pi∆(·|gt, Bt, dt, dt−1, ..., dt−K) some K > 0, denoting that possible partial payments depend
on the credit history and level of debt. See Reinhart et al. [2003], Reinhart and Rogoff [2008] and Yue [2010] for
an intuition behind this structure.
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δt = 1 with probability one, which implies that if the government decides not to default at time
t, it will pay the totality of the outstanding debt.
Finally, we use Π to denote the probability distribution over Ω∞ generated by assumption
2.1, and Π(·|ωt) to denote the conditional probability over Ω, given ωt.
The next definitions formalize the concepts of government policy, allocation, prices of bonds
and the government budget constraint. In particular, it formally introduces the fact that taxes,
default decisions and debt depend on histories of past realizations of shocks, and in particular
that debt is non-state contingent (i.e., Bt+1 only depends on the history up to time t, ω
t).
Definition 2.1. A government policy is a collection of stochastic processes σ = (Bt+1, τt, dt, at)
∞
t=0,
such that for each t, (Bt+1, τt, dt, at) ∈ B× [0, 1]× {0, 1}2 are measurable with respect to ωt and
(B0, φ−1).
Definition 2.2. An allocation is a collection of stochastic processes (gt, ct, nt)
∞
t=0 such that for
each t, (gt, ct, nt) ∈ G× R+ × [0, 1] are measurable with respect to ωt and (B0, φ−1).
Given a government policy, we say an allocation is feasible if for any (t, ωt)
ct(ω
t) + gt = κt(ω
t)nt(ω
t), (2.1)
where κt : Ω
t → R+ is such that κt(ωt) is the productivity at period t, given history ωt. For
simplicity, we set κt(ω
t) = φt(ω
t) + κ(1− φt(ωt)) with κ ∈ (0, 1]. The fraction 1− κ represents
direct output loss following a default event, associated for example with financial disruption in
the banking sector, limited insurance against idiosyncratic risk, among others.
Definition 2.3. A price process is an stochastic process (pt)
∞
t=0 such that for each t, pt ∈ R+ is
measurable with respect to ωt and (B0, φ−1).
Note that pt denotes the price of one unit of debt in any state of the world, both with
access to financial markets and during autarky, where it represents the price of defaulted debt
in secondary markets. Finally, we introduce the government budget constraint.
Definition 2.4. A government policy σ is attainable, if for all (t, ωt),
gt + φt(ω
t)δtBt(ω
t−1) ≤ κt(ωt)τt(ωt)nt(ωt) + φt(ωt)pt(ωt)Bt+1(ωt), (2.2)
and dt(ω
t) = 1 if φt−1(ωt−1) = 0 and at(ωt) = 0 if φt−1(ωt−1) = 1 or δt = δ¯.11
11The inequality in equation 2.2 implies that the government can issue lump-sum transfers to the households.
Lump-sum taxes are not permitted.
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Observe that in equation 2.2, if the government is in financial autarky (φt(ω
t) = 0), its
budget constraint boils down to gt ≤ κt(ωt)τt(ωt)nt(ωt). On the other hand, if the government
has access to financial markets (φt(ω
t) = 1), then it has liabilities to be repaid for δtBt and can
issue new debt.12 The final restriction on dt(ω
t) and at(ω
t) simply states that if last period the
government was in financial autarky, then it trivially cannot choose to default at time t, and if
δt = δ¯ or if last period the government had access to financial markets at(ω
t) is set to 0.
A few final remarks about the “debt-restructuring process” are in order. This process intends
to capture the fact that after defaults, economies see their access to credit severely hindered.13
The parameters (λ, pi∆) capture the fact that debt restructuring is time-consuming but, generally,
at the end a positive fraction of the defaulted debt is honored.
2.3 The Household’s Problem
There is a continuum of identical households that are price takers and have time-separable
preferences for consumption and labor processes. They also make savings decisions by trading
government bonds. Formally, we define a household debt process as a stochastic process given
by (bt+1)
∞
t=0 where bt+1 : Ω
t → [b, b] is the household’s savings in government bonds at time t+1
for any history ωt.14
For convenience, let qt denote the price of defaulted debt at time t, i.e., qt = pt if φt = 0.
Given a government policy σ, for each t, let %t : Ω
t → R be the payoff of a government bond at
period t, i.e.
%t(ω
t) = φt(ω
t)δt + (1− φt(ωt))qt(ωt). (2.3)
From the households’ point of view (which takes government actions as given) the debt is an
asset with a state-dependent payoff. This dependence clearly illustrates that default decisions
add certain degree of state contingency to the government debt. In particular, if φt(ω
t) = 1,
then %t(ω
t) = δt denoting the fact that the government pays a fraction δt. If the government
defaults or rejects the repayment option, the household can sell each unit of government debt
in the secondary market at a price %t(ω
t) = qt(ω
t).
12If the government had access to financial markets at time t − 1 (φt−1 = 1), then by assumption 2.1, δt = 1
and the outstanding debt if simply Bt.
13The duration of debt restructuring after sovereign defaults in particular on external debt has received consid-
erable attention in the literature. For instance, for Argentina’s default in 2001 the settlement with the majority of
the creditors was reached in 2005. In the default episodes of Russia (1998), Ecuador (1999) and Ukraine (1998),
the renegotiation process lasted 2.3, 1.7 and 1.4 years, respectively, according to Benjamin and Wright [2009]. In
general, domestic debt restructuring periods tend to be not as long as in the case of external debt. For example,
as documented by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer [2006], after the default by Russia in 1998 it took six months to
restructure the domestic GKO bonds.
14We assume bt+1 ∈ [b, b] with [b, b] ⊃ B so in equilibrium these restrictions will not be binding.
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The household’s problem consists of choosing consumption, labor and debt processes in order
to maximize the expected lifetime utility. That is, given (ω0, b0) and σ,
sup
(ct,nt,bt+1)∞t=0∈C(g0,b0;σ)
EΠ(·|ω0)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct(ω
t), 1− nt(ωt))
]
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, EΠ(·|ω0)[·] is the expectation using the conditional prob-
ability Π(·|ω0), and C(g0, b0;σ) is the set of household’s allocations and debt process, given
government policy σ, such that for all t and all ωt ∈ Ωt,
ct(ω
t) + pt(ω
t)bt+1(ω
t) = (1− τt(ωt))κt(ωt)nt(ωt) + %t(ωt)bt(ωt−1) + Tt(ωt),
where Tt(ω
t) ≥ 0 are lump-sum transfers from the government.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
We now define a competitive equilibrium for a given government policy and derive the equilib-
rium taxes and prices.
Definition 3.1. Given ω0, B0 = b0 and φ−1, a competitive equilibrium is a government policy,
σ, an allocation, (gt, ct, nt)
∞
t=0, a household debt process, (bt+1)
∞
t=0, and a price process (pt)
∞
t=0
such that:
1. Given the government policy and the price process, the allocation and debt process solve
the household’s problem.
2. The government policy, σ, is attainable.
3. The allocation is feasible.
4. For all (t, ωt), Bt+1(ω
t) = bt+1(ω
t), and Bt+1(ω
t) = Bt(ω
t−1) if φt(ωt) = 0.
The market clearing for debt imposes that, if the economy is in financial autarky — where the
government cannot issue debt, and thus agents can only trade among themselves —, Bt+1(ω
t) =
Bt(ω
t−1). This implies, since agents are identical, that in equilibrium bt(ωt−1) = bt+1(ωt), i.e.,
agents do not change their debt positions.
3.1 Equilibrium Prices and Taxes
In this section we present the expressions for equilibrium taxes and prices of debt. The former
quantity is standard (e.g. Aiyagari et al. [2002] and Lucas and Stokey [1983]); the latter quantity,
however, incorporates the possibility of default of the government. The following assumption is
standard and ensures that u is smooth enough to compute first order conditions.
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Assumption 3.1. u ∈ C2(R+ × [0, 1],R) with uc > 0, ucc < 0, ul > 0 and ull < 0, and
liml→0 ul(l) =∞.15
Henceforth, for any (t, ωt), we use uc(ω
t) as uc(ct(ω
t), 1− nt(ωt)) and proceed similarly for
other derivatives and functions. From the first order conditions of the optimization problem of
the households (assuming an interior solution) the following equations hold for any (t, ωt),16
ul(ω
t)
uc(ωt)
= (1− τt(ωt))κt(ωt), (3.4)
and
pt(ω
t) =EΠ(·|ωt)
[
β
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
%t+1(ω
t+1)
]
=βEΠ(·|ωt)
[
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
φt+1(ω
t+1)δt+1
]
+ βEΠ(·|ωt)
[
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
(1− φt+1(ωt+1))qt+1(ωt+1)
]
(3.5)
Given the definition of % and the restrictions on Π, equation 3.5 implies for φt(ω
t) = 1,17
pt(ω
t) =β
∫
G
(
uc(ω
t, g′, 1)
uc(ωt)
(1− dt+1(ωt, g′, 1))
)
piG(dg
′|gt)
+ β
∫
G
uc(ω
t, g′, 1)
uc(ωt)
dt+1(ω
t, g′, 1)qt+1(ωt, g′)piG(dg′|gt), (3.6)
and for φt(ω
t) = 0
qt(ω
t) =βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
(
uc(ω
t, g′, δ′)
uc(ωt)
δ′at+1(ωt, g′, δ′)
)
pi∆(dδ
′)piG(dg′|gt)
+ βλ
∫
G
{∫
∆
(
uc(ω
t, g′, δ′)
uc(ωt)
(1− at+1(ωt, g′, δ′))pi∆(dδ′)
)}
qt+1(ω
t, g′)piG(dg′|gt)
+ β(1− λ)
∫
G
(
uc(ω
t, g′, δ¯)
uc(ωt)
)
qt+1(ω
t, g′)piG(dg′|gt). (3.7)
Equation 3.5 reflects the fact that in equilibrium households anticipate the default strategies
of the government and demand higher returns to compensate for the default risk. The second line
in the Euler equation 3.6 shows that, due to the possibility of partial repayments in the future,
defaulted debt has positive value and agents can sell it in a secondary market at price qt+1(ω
t+1).
15C2(X,Y ) is the space of twice continuously differentiable functions from X to Y , the subscript c denotes the
derivative with respect to the first argument and the subscript l with respect to the second one. The assumption
ucc < 0 could be relaxed to include ucc = 0 (see section 5 below).
16See appendix B for the derivation.
17The notation (ωt, g, δ) denotes the partial history ωt+1 where (gt+1, δt+1) = (g, δ). As it will become clear
below, the price qt does not depend on δt, so we omit it from the notation. Also, when φt+1(ω
t+1) = 0, uc(ω
t+1)
is actually only a function of gt+1 (not the entire past history ω
t+1) because in equilibrium the government runs
a balanced budget.
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Equation 3.7 characterizes this price. Each summand in the right-hand side corresponds to a
“branch” of the tree depicted in figure 2.1. The first line represents the value of one unit of debt
when an offer arrives and the government decides to repay the realized fraction of the defaulted
debt next period. The second and third lines capture the value of one unit of debt when either
the government decides to reject the repayment offer, or it does not receive one.
It is easy to show that if uc = 1, λ = 0, the equilibrium price described in equations 3.6
and 3.7 coincide with that in the standard sovereign default model (e.g., Arellano [2008] and
Aguiar and Gopinath [2006]). The novelty of our pricing equations with respect to the standard
sovereign default model is the presence of secondary market prices, qt. By allowing for a positive
recovery rate, the model is able to deliver a positive price of defaulted debt during the financial
autarky period. In sections 5 and 6, we analyze further the pricing implications of this model.
3.2 Characterization of the Competitive Equilibrium
In this environment, the set of competitive equilibria can be characterized by a sequence of non-
linear equations which impose restrictions on (dt, at, Bt+1, nt)
∞
t=0 and are derived from the first
order conditions of the household, the budget constraint of the government and the feasibility
condition. The next theorem formalizes this claim.
Henceforth, we call (dt, at, Bt+1, nt)
∞
t=0 an outcome path of allocations. We say an outcome
path is consistent with a competitive equilibrium if the outcome path and (ct, pt, bt+1, τt, gt)
∞
t=0,
derived using the market clearing, feasibility and first order conditions, is a competitive equilib-
rium. Also, let
Zt(ω
t) ≡ z(κt(ωt), nt(ωt), gt) =
(
κt(ω
t)− ul(ω
t)
uc(ωt)
)
nt(ω
t)− gt (3.8)
be the primary surplus (if it is negative, it represents a deficit) at time t given history ωt ∈ Ωt.
Theorem 3.1. Given ω0, B0 = b0 and φ−1, the outcome path (dt, at, Bt+1, nt)∞t=0 is consistent
with a competitive equilibrium iff for all (t, ωt) ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} × Ωt, the following holds:
Zt(ω
t)uc(ω
t) + φt(ω
t){pt(ωt)uc(ωt)Bt+1(ωt)− δtuc(ωt)Bt(ωt−1)} ≥ 0, (3.9)
Bt+1(ω
t) = Bt(ω
t−1) if φt(ωt) = 0,
and ct(ω
t) = κt(ω
t)nt(ω
t)− gt(ωt) and equations 3.4 and 3.6 hold.
For any (ω,B, φ) ∈ (G×∆)×B× {0, 1}, let CEφ(ω,B) denote the set of all outcome paths
that are consistent with competitive equilibria, given ω0 = ω, φ0(ω0) = φ and where B is the
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outstanding debt of time 0, after any potential debt restructuring in that period.18 We observe
that by setting φ0(ω0) = φ we are implicitly imposing restrictions on a0, d0, φ−1 and δ0.19
Equation 3.9 summarizes the budget constraint of the government but replacing prices and
taxes by the first order conditions, as in the “primal approach” used by Lucas and Stokey [1983]
and Aiyagari et al. [2002].
4 The Government Problem
The government is benevolent and maximizes the welfare of the representative household by
choosing policies. The government, however, cannot commit to repaying the debt, but commits
to previous tax promises until a debt restructuring takes place. This assumption facilitates
the comparison to the optimal taxation literature in the spirit of Lucas and Stokey [1983] and
Aiyagari et al. [2002].
For autarky states, the government chooses taxes that balance its budget. Once the govern-
ment accepts an offer to restructure the debt, it regains access to financial markets and starts
anew, without any outstanding tax promises, by assumption. A similar feature is present in
Debortoli and Nunes [2010], where the government can randomly re-optimize and reset fiscal
policies with a given exogenous probability.20
The government problem can thus be viewed as a problem involving two types of authorities:
a default authority and a fiscal authority. On the one hand, the default authority can be seen as
comprised of a sequence of one-period administrations, where the time-t administration makes
the default and repayment decision in period t, taking as given the behavior of all the other
agents including the fiscal authority. On the other hand, the fiscal authority can be viewed as
a sequence of consecutive administrations, each of which stays in office until there is a debt
renegotiation. While ruling, a fiscal administration has the ability to commit, and chooses the
optimal fiscal and debt processes, taking as given the behavior of the default authority. When
debt is renegotiated, the fiscal administration is replaced by a new one, which is not bound by
previous tax promises, and is free to reset the fiscal and debt policy.21
18Constructing the set CEφ(ω,B) is useful since, in order to make a default/repayment decision, the default
authority evaluates alternative utility values both for repayment and for autarky that are sustained by competitive
equilibrium allocations.
19For example, if φ0 = 1 we could only arrive to it because either φ−1 = 1 and d0 = 0, given (g0, B0) = (g,B),
or because φ−1 = 0 with defaulted debt B˜0 = B0/δ0 and offer δ0 is accepted (a0 = 1).
20In our model, however, the resetting event, given by the debt restructuring, is an equilibrium outcome that
emerges endogenously.
21We focus exclusively on symmetric strategies for households, where all of them take the same decisions along
the equilibrium path. Similarly, we assume that all default and fiscal administrations choose identical actions
conditional on the same state of the economy, thereby introducing a Markovian structure for optimal strategies.
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4.1 The Government Policies
For any t ∈ {0, 1, ...}, let ht ≡ (φt−1, Bt, ωt) and ht ≡ (h0, h1, ...., ht) be the public history until
time t. We use Ht to denote the set of all public histories until time t.
A government strategy is given by a strategy for the default and fiscal authorities, γ ≡
(γD,γF ). The strategy for the default authority γD specifies a default and a repayment de-
cision for any period t and any public history ht ∈ Ht, i.e., γD = (γDt (·))∞t=0 with γDt (ht) ≡
(dt(h
t), at(h
t)) for any ht ∈ Ht. The strategy for the fiscal authority, γF , specifies next pe-
riod’s debt level for any public history ht ∈ Ht and any φt, i.e., γF = (γFt (·, ·))∞t=0 with
γFt (h
t, φt) ≡ Bt+1(ht, φt) for any (ht, φt) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}. The fact that γFt (ht, φt) depends on
φt reflects our assumption on the timing protocol by which the default authority moves first
in each period.22 To stress that a particular policy action, say Bt+1(h
t, φt), belongs to a given
strategy we use Bt+1(γ)(h
t, φt).
Let γ|(ht,φt) denote the continuation of strategy γ after history (ht, φt) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}.23 We
say a strategy γ is consistent with a competitive equilibrium, if after any (ht, φt) ∈ Ht × {0, 1},
the outcome path generated by γ|(ht,φt) belongs to CEφt(ωt, B) with outstanding debt B =
(δtφt + (1− φt))Bt(γ)(ht−1, φt−1(γ)(ht−1)). That is, if there is full repayment (i.e. no default)
or not borrowing at all in the current period t, the debt level B is given by the bond holdings
carried over from last period. Otherwise, if the government just regained access by accepting
an offer δt, B is the restructured debt level. For any h0 ∈ H and φ0 ∈ {0, 1}, we use S(h0, φ0)
to denote the set of such strategies; see appendix D for the formal expression of S(h0, φ0).
Henceforth, we only consider strategies that are consistent with competitive equilibrium.
Finally, for any public history ht ∈ Ht, φ ∈ {0, 1} and γ ∈ S(h0, φ), let
Vt(γ)(h
t, φ) = EΠ(·|ωt)
 ∞∑
j=0
βju(κt+j(ω
t+j)nt+j(γ)(ω
t+j)− gt+j , 1− nt+j(γ)(ωt+j))
 (4.10)
be the expected lifetime utility of the representative household at time t, given strategy γ|(ht,φ).
4.2 Default and Renegotiation Policies
As mentioned before, the default authority can be viewed as comprised by a sequence of one-
period administrations, each of which makes the default and renegotiation decision in its re-
spective period, taking as given the behavior of all the other agents including the other default
22We omit labor taxes (or labor directly) as part of the government strategy because, given (ht, φt) and
γFt (h
t, φt), labor taxes are obtained from the budget constraint. For this reason we do not include them as
part of the public history.
23Observe that while a strategy prescribes that the default authority moves first at t = 0, with the continuation
strategy, as we defined, the fiscal authority is moving first at t and then the default authority moves at t+ 1.
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and fiscal administrations. It is easy to see that, for each public history ht ∈ Ht, the default
authority will optimally choose as follows: if φt−1 = 1
d∗t (γ)(h
t) =
{
0 if Vt(γ)(h
t, 1) ≥ Vt(γ)(ht, 0)
1 if Vt(γ)(h
t, 1) < Vt(γ)(h
t, 0)
(4.11)
and if φt−1 = 0
a∗t (γ)(h
t) =
{
1 if Vt(γ)(h
t, 1) ≥ Vt(γ)(ht, 0)
0 if Vt(γ)(h
t, 1) < Vt(γ)(h
t, 0)
(4.12)
The dependence on γ denotes the fact that d∗t and a∗t are associated with the strategy of the
fiscal authority γF . Indeed, to specify the optimal default and repayment decisions at any
history ht ∈ Ht we need to know the value of repayment and the value of default, Vt(γ)(ht, 1)
and Vt(γ)(h
t, 0), respectively, which are functions of γF .24
4.3 Recursive Representation of the Government Problem
Taking as given the optimal decision rules 4.11 and 4.12 for the default authority, we now
turn to the optimization problem of the fiscal authority and the recursive representation of the
government problem. To do so, we adopt a recursive representation for the competitive equilibria
by introducing an adequate state variable. Following Kydland and Prescott [1980] and Chang
[1998] among others, it follows that the relevant (co-)state variable is the “promised” marginal
utilities of consumption.25
For any h0 = (φ−1, B0, g0, δ0) ∈ H and φ ∈ {0, 1}, let Ω(h0, φ) be the set of all marginal
utility values (µ) and lifetime utilities (v) that can be sustained in a competitive equilibrium,
wherein the default authority reacts optimally from next period on; see appendix D for the
formal expression of Ω(h0, φ). This set differs from the standard set of equilibrium promised
marginal utilities in Kydland and Prescott [1980] along some dimensions. In particular, in an
standard Ramsey problem it would suffice to only specify the set of promised marginal utilities,
but in our framework with endogenous default decisions we find it necessary to also specify
continuation values to evaluate alternative courses of action of the default authority. By the
same token, we compute this set for any φ, even for the value of φ not optimally chosen by the
default authority through its policy action.
24Also, recall that by assumption a∗t (γ)(h
t) = 0 if φt−1 = 1 or δt = δ¯ and d∗t (γ)(h
t) = 1 if φt−1 = 0.
25By keeping track of the profile of “promised” marginal utilities of consumption, we ensure that the fiscal
authority commits to deliver the “promised” marginal utility as long as the default authority does not restructure
the debt. If the debt is restructured and a new fiscal administration takes power, it sets the current marginal
utility at its convenience, which in equilibrium is anticipated by the households.
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For any (g,B, µ) ∈ G×B×R+, let V ∗1 (g,B, µ) be the value of a fiscal authority that had access
to financial markets last period and continue to have it this current period (i.e., φ−1 = φ = 1)
and that takes as given the optimal behavior of the default and subsequent fiscal authorities,
with outstanding debt B and a promised marginal utility of µ and government expenditure g.
Similarly, let V ∗0 (g,B) be the value of a fiscal authority that does not have access to financial
markets (i.e., φ = 0). Observe that since in financial autarky the government ought to run a
balanced budget, V ∗0 does not depend on µ.
Finally, let V
∗
1(g, δB) be the value of a “new” fiscal authority (i.e., when φ−1 = 0 and φ = 1)
that takes as given the optimal behavior of the default and subsequent fiscal authorities, when
an offer δ is accepted, government spending equals g and the outstanding defaulted debt is B.
In this case the fiscal authority does not have any outstanding “promised” marginal utility and
thus it sets the current marginal utility at its convenience. Thus, by definition of Ω,
V
∗
1(g, δB) = max{v|(µ, v) ∈ Ω(0, B, g, δ, 1)}, (4.13)
and let µ(g, δ, B) = {µ|(µ, V ∗1(g, δB)) ∈ Ω(0, B, g, δ, 1)} be the associated marginal utility.
Given the aforementioned value functions, the optimal policy functions of the default au-
thority in expressions 4.11 and 4.12 become26
d∗(g,B, µ) =
{
0 if V ∗1 (g,B, µ) ≥ V ∗0 (g,B)
1 if V ∗1 (g,B, µ) < V ∗0 (g,B)
(4.14)
and
a∗(g, δ, B) =
{
1 if V
∗
1(g, δB) ≥ V ∗0 (g,B)
0 if V
∗
1(g, δB) < V
∗
0 (g,B)
(4.15)
The next theorem presents a recursive formulation for the value functions. In what follows,
we denote the marginal utility of consumption in financial autarky as mA(g) for all g ∈ G.27
Theorem 4.1. The value functions V ∗0 and V ∗1 satisfy the following recursions: For any (g,B, µ),
V ∗1 (g,B, µ) = max
(n,B′,µ′(·))∈Γ(g,B,µ)
{
u(n− g, 1− n) + β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B′, µ′(g′)), V ∗0 (g′, B′)}piG(dg′|g)
}
,
(4.16)
and
V ∗0 (g,B) =u(κn
∗
0(g)− g, 1− n∗0(g)) + βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
max{V ∗1(g′, δ′B), V ∗0 (g′, B)}pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|g)
+ β(1− λ)
∫
G
V ∗0 (g
′, B)piG(dg′|g) (4.17)
26As indicated before, by assumption, d∗(g,B, µ) = 1 if φ−1 = 0 and a∗(g, δ, B) = 0 if φ−1 = 1 or δ = δ¯.
27Formally, mA(g) = uc(κn
∗
0(g)− g, 1− n∗0(g)) where n∗0(g) = arg maxn∈[0,1]{u(κn− g, 1− n) : z(κ, n, g) = 0}.
See appendix D for details.
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where,
Γ(g,B, µ) =
{
(n,B′, µ′(·)) ∈ [0, 1]× B× R|G| :
(B′, µ′(g′), V ∗1 (g
′, B′, µ′(g′)) ∈ Graph(Ω(1, ·, g′, 1, 1)), ∀g′ ∈ G
µ = uc(n− g, 1− n) and z(1, n, g)µ+ P∗1 (g,B′, µ′(·))B′ −Bµ ≥ 0
}
(4.18)
and, for any (B′, µ′(·)),
P∗1 (g,B′, µ′(·)) =β
∫
G
(
(1− d∗(g′, B′, µ′(g′)))µ′(g′) + d∗(g′, B′, µ′(g′))mA(g′)P∗0 (g′, B′)
)
piG(dg
′|g)
P∗0 (g,B′) =β
∫
G
(∫
∆
µ(g′, δ′, B′)δ′a∗(g′, δ′, B′)pi∆(dδ′) + pi∗A(g
′, B′)mA(g′)P∗0 (g′, B′)
)
piG(dg
′|g)
where pi∗A(g,B) ≡
{
(1− λ) + λ ∫∆(1− a∗(g, δ, B))pi∆(dδ)}.
Below we present some particular cases of special interest in order to illustrate the objects
in the previous theorem.
Example 4.1 (non-defaultable debt). Consider an economy with (ad hoc) risk-free debt. The
value function V ∗0 is irrelevant and V ∗1 boils down to
V ∗1 (g,B, µ) = max
(n,B′,µ′(·))∈Γ(g,B,µ)
{
u(n− g, 1− n) + β
∫
G
V ∗1 (g
′, B′, µ′(g′))piG(dg′|g)
}
where
Γ(g,B, µ) =
{
(n,B′, µ′(·)) : z(1, n, g)µ+ βEpiG(·|g)[µ′(g′)]B′ −Bµ ≥ 0
where µ = uc(n− g, 1− n)
}
.
In addition, since there is no “re-setting” time, V¯ ∗1 coincides with the value function at time
0 with µ chosen optimally. This case is precisely the type of model studied in Aiyagari et al.
[2002].
The following example is analogous to the models studied by Arellano [2008] and Aguiar and
Gopinath [2006] among others, but with a “non-standard” per-period utility that reflects the
distortive nature of the labor tax.
Example 4.2 (quasi-linear per-period payoff, λ ≥ 0, and pi∆ = 1{0}). Assume that u(c, 1−n) =
c + H(1 − n) for some function H consistent with assumption 3.1. Under this assumption, µ
can be dropped as a state variable since uc = 1 and thus it does not affect the pricing equation.
In this case, the value during financial autarky is given by
V ∗0 (g) =κn
∗
0(g)− g +H(1− n∗0(g)) + β
∫
G
(
λV ∗1 (g
′, 0) + (1− λ)V ∗0 (g′)
)
piG(dg
′|g).
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Note that there is no need to keep the debt B as part of the state during financial autarky since
none of the defaulted debt is ever repaid, and all the offers of zero repayment are accepted by the
government. The value during financial access is given by
V ∗1 (g,B) = max
(n,B′)∈Γ(g,B)
{
n− g +H(1− n) + β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B′), V ∗0 (g′)}piG(dg′|g)
}
,
where Γ(g,B) ≡ {(n,B′) : z(1, n, g) + βEpiG(·|g)[1{g′:V ∗1 (g′,B′)≥V ∗0 (g′)}(g′)]B′ −B ≥ 0}.
Moreover, assuming H ′(1) < 1 and 2H ′′(l) < H ′′′(l)(1 − l), we can view the government
problem as directly choosing tax revenues R with a per-period payoff given by Wκ(R) = κnκ(R)+
H(1 − nκ(R)) where nκ(R) is the amount of labor needed to collect revenues equal to R, given
κ. Under our assumptions, Wκ is non-increasing and concave function. The Bellman equation
of the value of repayment is given by
V ∗1 (g,B) = max
(R,B′)
{
W1(R)− g + β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B′), V ∗0 (g′)}piG(dg′|g)
}
, (4.19)
subject to R+ βEpiG(·|g)[1{g′:V ∗1 (g′,B′)≥V ∗0 (g′)}(g
′)]B′ ≥ g +B, and
V ∗0 (g) =Wκ(g)− g + β
∫
G
(
λV ∗1 (g
′, 0) + (1− λ)V ∗0 (g′)
)
piG(dg
′|g). (4.20)
This problem is analogous to that studied in Arellano [2008] and Aguiar and Gopinath [2006]
among others, where the government chooses how much to “consume”, captured by −R, given
an exogenous process of “income”, −g. An important difference, however, is the non-standard
per-period payoff which has a satiation point at R = 0 (i.e., zero distortive taxes).28 
In the previous example, the expression for the price function, EpiG(·|g)[1{g′:V ∗1 (g′,·)≥V ∗0 (g′)}(g
′)],
highlights an important difference between our default model and a model with risk-free debt
such as Aiyagari et al. [2002] (henceforth, AMSS). Since uc = 1, the market stochastic discount
factor is equal to β, and thus in the AMSS model the government cannot manipulate the return
of the discount bond. In our economy, however, the government is still able to manipulate the
return of the discount bond by altering its payoff through the decision of default.
5 Analytical Results
We present analytical results for a benchmark model characterized by quasi-linear per-period
utility and i.i.d. government expenditure shocks. The proofs for the results are gathered in
appendix E.
28Another subtle difference with the standard sovereign default literature is that while in our economy govern-
ment and bondholders share the same preference, in this literature they do not. In particular, the government
tends to be more impatient than (foreign) investors, thus bringing about incentives to front-load consumption
through borrowing.
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Assumption 5.1. (i) κ = 1; (ii) u(c, n) = c+H(1−n) where H ∈ C2((0, 1),R) with H ′(0) =∞,
H ′(l) > 0, H ′(1) < 1, H ′′(l) < 0 and 2H ′′(l) < H ′′′(l)(1− l)
Part (i) implies that there are no direct cost of defaults in terms of output. Part (ii) of
this assumption imposes that the per-period utility of the households is quasi-linear and it is
analogous to assumption in p. 10 in AMSS. As noted above, under this assumption, µ can be
dropped as a state variable. This implies that the value functions V ∗0 , V ∗1 are only functions of
(g,B) and the same holds true for the optimal policy functions. We also assume that government
expenditure are i.i.d., formally
Assumption 5.2. For any g′ 6= g, piG(·|g) = piG(·|g′).
With a slight abuse of notation and to simplify the exposition we use piG(·) to denote the
probability measure of g. Finally, to further simplify the technical details, we assume that B has
only finitely many points, unless stated otherwise.29 For the rest of the section, assumptions 5.1
and 5.2 hold and will not be referenced explicitly.
5.1 Characterization of Optimal Default Decisions
The next proposition characterizes the optimal decisions to default and to accept offers to repay
the defaulted debt as “threshold decisions”. These results extends those in Arellano [2008] to
our setting, where, among other things, we allow for partial repayments of government debt.
Recall that d∗(g,B) and a∗(g, δ, B) are the optimal decision of default and of renegotiation,
respectively, given the state (g, δ, B).
Proposition 5.1. There exists λ¯ such that for all λ ∈ [0, λ¯], the following holds:
1. There exists a δˆ : G× B→ ∆ such that a∗(g, δ, B) = 1{δ:δ≤δˆ(g,B)}(δ) and δˆ non-increasing
as a function of B.
2. There exists a g¯ : B→ G such that d∗(g,B) = 1{g:g≥g¯(B)}(g) and g¯ non-increasing for all
B > 0.
This result shows that for a (non-trivial) range of probabilities of receiving outside of-
fers, λ ∈ [0, λ¯], default is more likely to occur for high levels of debt, and so are rejections
of offers to exit financial autarky. The latter result implies that the average recovery rate,
EpiG [
∫
δ′∈∆ δ
′1{δ : δ≤δˆ(g,B)}(δ
′)pi∆(dδ′)], is decreasing in the level of debt, as documented by Yue
[2010] in the data. It also follows that other things equal, higher debt levels are on average
29This assumption is made for simplicity. It can be relaxed to allow for general compact subsets, but some of
the arguments in the proofs will have to be changed slightly. Also, B ≡ {B1, ..., B|B|} is only imposed for the
government; the households can still choose from convex sets; only in equilibrium we impose {B1, ..., B|B|}.
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associated with longer financial autarky periods. Thus, these two results imply a positive co-
movement between the (observed) average haircut and the average length of financial autarky.
This last fact is consistent with the data: See fact 3 in Benjamin and Wright [2009] and also
Cruces and Trebesch [2013] found a similar relationship for 180 sovereign debt restructuring
cases of 68 countries between 1970 and 2010.30
5.2 Implications for Equilibrium Prices and Taxes
We now study the implications of the above results on equilibrium prices and taxes.
Equilibrium prices and endogenous debt limits. Under assumption 5.2 equilibrium
prices do not depend on g, i.e., P∗φ(·) ≡ P∗φ(g, ·) for any g ∈ B. By proposition 5.1 it follows
that, for any B′ ∈ B,
P∗1 (B′) =β
∫
G
1{g′≤g¯(B′)}(g′)piG(dg′) +
(
β
∫
G
1{g′>g¯(B′)}(g′)piG(dg′)
)
P∗0 (B′) (5.21)
and31
P∗0 (B) =
βλ
∫
∆
(∫
G 1{δ:δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)piG(dg
′)
)
δpi∆(dδ)
1− β + βλ ∫∆ ∫G 1{δ:δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)piG(dg′)pi∆(dδ) . (5.22)
A key feature of endogenous default models is the existence of endogenous borrowing limits.
A necessary condition for this result to hold is that, due to the possibility of default, equilibrium
prices are non-increasing as a function of debt, thus implying a “Laffer-type curve” for the
revenues coming from selling bonds. In an economy without debt repayment (e.g., pi∆ = 1{0}),
it follows that P∗0 = 0 and P∗1 (B′) = β
∫
G 1{g:g≤g¯(B′)}(g
′)piG(dg′) which is non-increasing in B′
by proposition 5.1. Moreover, it takes value zero for sufficiently high B′. Therefore, there exists
an endogenous debt limit, i.e., finite value of B′ that maximize the debt revenue P∗1 (B′)B′. In
an economy where we allow for debt renegotiation, by inspection of equation 5.21 and the fact
that P∗0 ≥ 0, it is easy to see that, other things equal, the previous result is attenuated by the
presence of (potential) defaulted debt payments and secondary markets. The next proposition
shows that for (non-random) repayment offers, the price is non-increasing on the level of debt
and there are endogenous borrowing limits. Hence, high levels of debt are associated with higher
return on debt, both before and during financial autarky.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose pi∆(·) = 1δ0(·) for some δ0 ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exists a λ¯ > 0, such
that for all λ ∈ [0, λ¯], P∗i (·) is non-increasing for B > 0 and for i = 0, 1.
30It is important to note, however, that we derived the implications by looking at exogenous variations of the
debt level; in the data this quantity is endogenous and, in particular, varies with g. This endogeneity issue taken
into account in the numerical simulations.
31See lemma E.5(3) in the appendix for the derivation.
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This result is consistent with the evidence of the positive relationship between debt-to-output
levels and default risk measures; see section F in the supplementary material. In addition, the
existence of endogenous borrowing limits implies that the ability to roll over high levels of debt
is hindered. Since the primary surplus function z(1, ·, g) is concave in n, as shown in lemma
D.1 of appendix D, labor is more “sensitive” to fluctuations in government expenditure when
the indebtedness level is high. This feature is consistent with the stylized fact that on average
higher volatility of tax revenue-to-output ratios is observed when debt and default risk are high.
We further explore this mechanism in the numerical simulations.
Default risk and the law of motion of equilibrium taxes. In order to analyze the ex-
ante effect of default risk on the law of motion of taxes, we look at the case λ = 0 (i.e., autarky
is an absorbing state) to simplify the analysis. We also strengthen assumption 5.1 by requiring
that H ′′(l) < H ′′′(l)(1− l). By proposition 5.1, the default decision is a threshold decision, so for
each history ω∞ ∈ Ω∞ we can define T (ω∞) = inf{t : gt ≥ g¯(Bt(ωt−1))} (it could be infinity) as
the first time the economy enters in default. For all t ≤ T (ω∞) the economy is not in financial
autarky, and the implementability constraint is given by
Bt(ω
t−1) + gt ≤
(
1−H ′(1− nt(ωt))
)
nt(ω
t) + P∗1 (Bt+1(ωt))Bt+1(ωt),
where P∗1 (gt, Bt+1(ωt)) ≡ EpiG [1 − d∗(g′, Bt+1(ωt))]. Let νt(ωt) be the Lagrange multiplier
associated to this restriction in the optimization problem of the government, given ωt ∈ Ωt.
In appendix E.2 we derive the FONC of the government and provide a closed-form expression
for νt(ω
t) as a decreasing nonlinear function of nt(ω
t); see equation E.66. Hence, as noted by
AMSS, studying the law of motion of νt we can shed light on the law of motion of taxes.
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From the FONC of the government it follows (see appendix E.2 for the derivation)33,34
νt(ω
t)
(
1 +
dP∗1 (Bt+1(ωt))
dBt+1
Bt+1(ω
t)
P∗1 (Bt+1(ωt))
)
=
∫
G
νt+1(ω
t, g′)
1{g′ ≤ g¯(Bt+1(ωt))}∫
G 1{g′ ≤ g¯(Bt+1(ωt))}piG(dg′)
piG(dg
′).
(5.23)
Equation 5.23 reflects the role of debt for tax-smoothing purposes and the trade-off the
government is confronted with. The Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability
condition is constant in Lucas and Stokey [1983] and, thus, trivially a martingale. In Aiyagari
et al. [2002], away from the asset limits, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the imple-
mentability condition is a martingale with respect to the probability measure piG; i.e., the
32Under our assumptions, τt are decreasing in nt(ω
t) which, in turn, implies a positive relationship between νt
and τt.
33This derivation assumes that B is a convex set and piG has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
so as to make sense of differentiation. It also assumes differentiability of V ∗.
34The martingale property is also preserved if capital is added to the economy; see Farhi [2010].
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government spreads over time the tax burden up to the point that νt is equal to νt+1 in ex-
pected terms. Equation 5.23 implies that in our economy this is not the case; the presence of
default risk affects the law of motion of the Lagrange multiplier in two important ways. First,
the expectation is computed under the so-called default-adjusted probability measure, given by
1{·≤g¯(Bt+1(ωt))}∫
G 1{g′≤g¯(Bt+1(ωt))}piG(dg′)
piG(·). The default-adjusted probability measure is first-order dominated
by piG, which reflects the fact that the option to default adds “some” degree of state-contingency
to the payoff of the government debt; in particular it implies that only the states tomorrow in
which there is repayment, are relevant for the law of motion of νt. Moreover, to the extent that
νt(ω
t, .) is increasing, the left-hand side of the equation is lower than the expectation of νt+1
under piG. Second, νt(ω
t) in the left-hand side is multiplied by
(
1 +
dP∗1 (Bt+1(ωt))
dBt+1
Bt+1(ωt)
P∗1 (Bt+1(ωt))
)
,
which can be interpreted as the “markup” that the government has to pay for having the option
to default. In the presence of default risk the markup is less than one and hence νt is higher
than the expectation of νt+1 under the default-adjusted probability measure. This reflects the
fact that default risk entails higher borrowing costs and limited debt issuance which prevent the
government from smoothing taxes completely, as it would be the case if νt were a Martingale,
like in the risk-free debt economy.
These two forces act in opposite directions, and is not clear which one will prevail. In order
to shed more light on this issue, in section 6 we explore quantitatively this trade-off by studying
the impulse responses of νt.
6 Numerical Results
Throughout this section, we run a battery of numerical exercises in order to assess the im-
pact of endogenous default risk on fiscal policy and the overall economy’s dynamics. We com-
pare our findings with an economy in which the option to default is not present—precisely
the model considered in Aiyagari et al. [2002]. We denote the variables associated with this
model with a (sub)superscript “AMSS”; variables associated to our economy are denoted with
a (sub)superscript “ED” (short for Economy with Default).
A natural question that arises in this context is what characteristics of an economy will
prompt it to behave as the AMSS- or ED-type models prescribe, in particular when it comes to
the propensity or willingness to honor debt contracts. Several reasons have been put forth to
explain why some governments always repay while some others do not. One reason is attributed
to factors unrelated to the model, such as political instability and polarization, which could result
in lower discounting of future consumption by the incumbent ruling party and hence stronger
incentives to default.35 An alternative explanation, in line with our model, is that for AMSS-type
35See for example Cuadra and Sapriza [2008] and D’Erasmo [2011]. In a small open political economy where
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economies, default is more costly because they are financially more integrated, and the inability
to borrow from capital markets after a default could have a more severe impact on financing
of the firms, thus lowering their productivity (in our model represented by a lower κ).36 A
third explanation is connected to income inequality and re-distributional motives. High income
dispersion across domestic households provides stronger incentives to default to the government,
expropriate wealth and redistribute those resources to reduce inequality.37 Although we consider
these issues important, we think they are out of the scope of the present paper and do not explore
them herein. We take them as given and proceed to characterize the optimal government policies
in this economic environment.
The main focus of the numerical results is to describe some features pointed out in the
normative analysis, and not to replicate business cycle dynamics of any particular economy or
historical default event. The numerical simulations show that our model can spawn recurrent de-
fault episodes and is able to generate considerable levels of “debt intolerance” and high volatility
of taxes, compared to an analogous AMSS economy.
Parametrization and functional forms. The utility function is given by u(c, 1 − n) =
c+C1
(1−n)1−σ
1−σ . For this preference specification, it is easy to see that whether the fiscal authority
has the ability to commit to tax policies or not renders the same equilibrium results. In this
parametrization, we assume that the government expenditure gt follows an AR(1) log-normal
process
log gt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ log gt−1 + σεεt, with εt ∼ N(0, 1),
which is approximated by an 11-state Markov chain using Tauchen [1986] procedure.38
We choose the parameters of the model as follows: β = 0.97, ψ = 2, κ = 0.998 and
C1 = 0.15.
39 The parameter values for the stochastic process of the government expenditure
different political groups compete with each other for access to government resources, Amador [2011] arrives to
a different conclusion. The same arguments why political interactions lead to over-spending actually provide
incentives not to repudiate sovereign debt contracts.
36Along this line, in a general equilibrium setup Mendoza and Yue [2012] generates an endogenous loss of
output resulting from the substitution of imported inputs by less-efficient domestic ones as firms’ credit lines are
cut during default episodes. Instead, in Sosa-Padilla [2014] a financial disruption in the banking sector occurs
after a default event, as banks’ balance sheets deteriorate, causing a domestic credit crunch followed by an output
drop.
37D’Erasmo and Mendoza [2015] and Dovis et al. [2015] elaborate along this dimension.
38The debt state space B is constructed by discretizing [0, 0.4] into 800 grid-points The one-period gross risk-free
rate 1 + rf is equal to the reciprocal of the households’ discount factor β and bond spreads are computed as the
differential between bond returns and the risk-free rate. Finally, as in AMSS, we rule out negative lump-sum
transfers to the households. The model is solved numerically using value function iterations with a discrete state
space and an “outer” loop that iterates on prices until convergence.
39While the exogenous ad hoc output cost of default 1−κ is only 0.2 percent, the endogenous drop of consump-
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are µ = 0.114, ρ = 0.56 and σε = 0.037. For the debt restructuring process we choose a
probability of receiving an offer λ = 0.47, and consider ten equally-probable renegotiation offers
with equidistant haircuts ranging from 0.45 to 0.9.
We perform 5,000 Monte Carlo (MC) iterations, each consisting of sample paths of 2,500
observations for which the first 500 observations were disregarded in order to eliminate the effect
of the initial conditions. We then compute the statistics across MC simulations.
Behavior of debt. In the numerical simulations, default occurs at an average frequency of
around 1.8 percent.40 Households in the model anticipate the default strategies in equilibrium
and demand higher returns to hold the bond. Facing higher borrowing costs, the government
responds by issuing less debt. Consequently, the average level of indebtedness is significantly
lower in our environment than in AMSS model, as illustrated in figure 6.2. The histograms
(which were smoothed using kernel methods) of debt-to-output ratios in our model (solid red)
and in AMSS (dotted blue) are shown for different values of the government expenditure.41 First,
as the government expenditure increases, in both economies more debt is optimally chosen in
order to finance it due to tax-smoothing motives. In addition, the debt-to-output ratio in our
model becomes more concentrated the higher the value of g is. This clustering feature is due
to the fact that, as g increases, the government wants to issue more debt, but faces tighter
(endogenous) borrowing limits resulting from higher default risk. This behavior is in stark
contrast with the one for AMSS, where the debt-to-output ratios are more spread out and can
take higher values. In fact, for the bottom panels there is almost full separation between the
histogram of our model and that of AMSS. It is worth to note as well, that even for low values of g
(e.g. the top panel) our model exhibits “thinner right tail” for the distribution of debt-to-output
ratio, again illustrating the latent borrowing limits.
Behavior of taxes. As mentioned in section 5, we typically observe in the data that default
risk and tax volatility are positively correlated and that both are higher for high levels of debt-
to-output ratio. Figure 6.3 shows that our model is able to generate this pattern. The blue
(red) dots indicate the standard deviation of taxes and spreads for low (high) levels of debt,
respectively. Each dot corresponds to the subsample of periods with financial access in a MC
simulation. The solid black line represents the regression line. For low (high) debt we consider
debt-to-output ratios below (over) the median of its asymptotic distribution. For both cases
tion is significantly larger. Indeed, if the government runs a balanced budget, the autarkic level of consumption
is over 1 percent lower than its counterpart in repayment for high government spending.
40The unconditional default frequency is computed as the sample mean of the number of default events in the
simulations.
41To construct the histogram, we disregarded few observations of debt-to-output ratios corresponding to bond
spread levels exceeding 50 percent.
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Figure 6.2: Histograms of debt-to-output ratio for our model (solid red) and AMSS (dotted
blue) conditioned on different values of g. From top to bottom, the five panels correspond to
the second, fourth, sixth, eighth and tenth gridpoint of g.
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.069
0.071
0.073
0.075
0.077
0.079
0.081
average spread (%)
tax
 vo
lati
lity
 
 
low debt
high debt
Figure 6.3: Standard deviation of tax rates and mean bond spreads in financial access for low
debt (blue) and high debt (red), and fitted OLS line between them (black line).
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Figure 6.4: Histogram of tax rates in financial access for our model (solid red) and AMSS (dotted
blue) conditioned on different values of g. From top to bottom, the five panels correspond to
the second, fourth, sixth, eighth and tenth realization of g.
we see a positive relationship between spreads and tax volatility, reflecting the government’s
limited ability to spread out the tax burden across time in the context of default risk. In the
simulations, the standard deviation of tax rates in financial access is roughly 50 percent higher
than in AMSS model. Another feature that stands out in the figure is that the red dotted-cloud
is shifted to the upper right corner of the graph with respect to the blue crossed-cloud, thus
indicating that both spreads and tax volatility are higher for higher level of debts.
In order to shed more light about the behavior of taxes when there is risk of default, we
compare in figure 6.4 the histograms (again smoothed using kernel methods) of tax rates in
our model (solid red) with that in AMSS (dotted blue), for different values of government
expenditure. First, as observed in the bottom panels, for high values of g the distribution of
taxes in our model is shifted to the right compared to that in AMSS model. This difference arises
from the fact that in our environment, with default risk, debt is too costly for the government
to finance high government expenditure and hence it has to resort to higher tax rates. In
contrast, in the top panels, when the g realization is low, the situation is reversed and now the
distribution of taxes in AMSS model is shifted to the right relative to our model. During those
states, the government repays the outstanding debt, which typically is higher in AMSS than in
our credit-constrained economy. In addition, in our model taxes are more concentrated around
a single peak (which shifts to the right with the level of government expenditure), reflecting
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more limited borrowing. In contrast, in AMSS the distribution of taxes is more spread-out for
each g realization but at the same time more less sensitive to changes in g, a clear reflection of
more tax smoothing.
Debt renegotiation. In table 6.1 we present some statistics regarding the debt renegotia-
tion process for different values of λ.
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Avg. offer accepted 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57
Avg. duration | High debt 10.08 6.69 6.03 5.19 5.06
Avg. duration | Low debt 9.46 5.82 3.42 3.16 2.92
Table 6.1: MC Statistics for Debt Renegotiation for Different Values of λ.
In the first row, as the probability of receiving an offer increases, the average offer accepted
decreases. This result follows because as λ increases the option value of staying in financial
autarky increases and thus the government accepts less offers. The last two rows in the table
show the average duration, conditioning on the fact that the defaulted debt is “high” (second
row) and “low” (third row).42 For both cases, it decreases as the probability of receiving an
offer increases, but more importantly it shows that for “high” levels of debt we have, on average,
longer financial autarky spells. In fact, the difference can be as large as 75 percent higher
for intermediate values of λ. This result coincides with the implications of proposition 5.1.
Moreover, as we see from the table, differences in the duration can be non-negligible.
Impulse responses. Figure 6.5 presents the impulse response for debt, fiscal primary
surplus and taxes for our model and AMSS. The path of government expenditure is plotted in
the first panel: the government expenditure is low and equal to 0.0915 except for t = 2, 3, 4
where it is high and equal to 0.159. The initial debt level is set to zero. While in both economies
the government accumulates debt in periods of higher government expenditure, in our model
it does so to a lesser extent due to the presence of endogenous borrowing limits. From t = 5
onwards, when government expenditure becomes low, the debt is gradually paid back, eventually
reaching zero.
Taxes behave analogously: in our economy taxes are higher than AMSS during the periods
of high government expenditure since borrowing is more limited and costly, but decrease more
rapidly when the realization of government expenditure becomes lower (see the third panel).
Overall, not surprisingly, a smoother behavior for taxes is observed in AMSS than in our econ-
omy, resulting from the absence of default risk. In both economies, a hike in the tax rate reduces
42As low (high) defaulted debt we consider debt-to-output ratios in the default episodes below (above) the
unconditional median.
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Figure 6.5: Impulse responses for our model (red) and AMSS (blue). Realization of government
expenditure (first panel), debt path (second panel), primary surplus path (third panel), tax path
(fourth panel), and Lagrange multiplier path (fifth path).
after-tax wages inducing substitution from labor to leisure (recall that with quasi-linear pref-
erences the labor supply curve is invariant to changes in wealth). Consequently, output drops.
Debt is more persistent than tax rates in both models, a feature that stands out under incom-
plete markets, as stressed by Marcet and Scott [2009]. Also, in line with the findings of Marcet
and Scott [2009], both economies experience a significant fiscal deficit as g increases and debt
grows. In AMSS model, since the government has more borrowing capacity, it therefore issues
more debt, and hence the fiscal deficit in the short run is relatively larger.
The last panel plots the behavior of the Lagrange multiplier νt of the implementability
constraint, studied in subsection 5.2. The fact that ours is above the one of AMSS for periods
of high government expenditure reflects the “mark-up” effect mentioned in subsection 5.2. Also
note that the Lagrange multiplier increases during these periods, reflecting the fact that the
shadow cost of debt is increasing in the level of debt. From t = 4 onwards, as debt decreases,
the Lagrange multiplier in our model falls and eventually converges to the one of AMSS.
Dynamics around default episodes. To better understand the role of default and its
implications for fiscal policy, we show here the evolution of taxes around a 9-period window
around the default event. To do so, we pick 1,000 default episodes in our simulations that were
preceded by at least 6 periods of access to financial markets and that were followed by at least
4 periods of financial exclusion. Figure 6.6 presents the dynamics of the cross-sectional medians
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of government spending and tax rates in AMSS and in our model around these default events.
We also compute a counterfactual tax rate in our economy assuming that the government is not
allowed to default at time 0 nor in any of the following 4 periods. The dashed lines correspond
to 25 and 75th-percentile bands for each series.
As shown in the top panel, default episodes are preceded by high government expenditure
realizations, which peak two periods ahead of the announcement. Even though government
expenditure drops in the subsequent two periods, it does not do so enough to prevent default
from occurring. Taxes remain on the rise to finance the government spending and the growing
debt built over time. In period 0 the government finds optimal to default and tax rates are cut
and continue declining thereafter. Had the government not defaulted, taxes would have jumped
by almost 50 percent and increase further in the next period, as debt continued rising. The fact
that the tax rate is lower upon defaulting than in the counterfactual scenario follows from lemma
E.4 in the appendix. This lemma shows that in the states in which default is optimal, if the
government repaid, it would not be able to raise any funds from the debt management for any
available debt contract. Rather, it would be subject to additional outlays. Consequently, taxes
would necessarily be higher in that case. Thus, by defaulting, the government avoids transiently
higher tax distortions. In the counterfactual scenario, as shown in the figure, after period 1 tax
rates start declining along with the debt level as the government expenditure becomes lower. In
sharp contrast with our economy, in AMSS taxes remain quite stable and more persistent, as
illustrated in the bottom panel. As expected, taxes after t = 0 do not decline as much as in our
economy, given the high outstanding debt that the government has to repay.
Aversion to consumption risk. In our previous parametrization we assumed that house-
holds were consumption-risk neutral by endowing them with quasi-linear preferences. In what
follows we relax this assumption by considering a balanced-growth preference specification,
as in Aiyagari et al. [2002] and Farhi [2010]. More specifically, we assume u(c, 1 − n) =
log c+C1
(1−n)1−σ
1−σ , with C1 = 0.05 and σ = 3. For computational purposes, in this new numerical
exercise, the government spending shock can only take three values: gL (“low”), gI (“normal”)
and gH (“expansionary”), such that gH > gI > gL, with transition probability matrix43
0.6 0.4 0
0.5 0.45 0.05
0.1 0.1 0.8

There is only one debt renegotiation offer δ = 0.7 with arrival probability λ = 0.5 and an
43Under this Markov chain for the government expenditure, borrowing is widely used to smooth taxes as the
economy fluctuates between the two (likely) states of gL and gI . Default typically occurs when the economy
switches to the persistent expansionary state gH carrying in high debt and remains in this state for a sufficiently
large number of periods.
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Figure 6.6: Default episode windows in model simulations. Top panel: Cross-sectional medians
of government expenditure. Middle panel: Actual (solid) and counterfactual (dotted) tax rates
in our economy. Bottom panel: Tax rates in AMSS. Dashed lines correspond to 25 and 75th-
percentile bands.
ad hoc output cost for default of 1 − κ equal to 0.4 percent. In this setup, low unconditional
probability of occurrence of gH together with a non-negligible output loss in autarky are sufficient
to deter the government from defaulting too often. The time discount factor β is set to 0.98.
Again, this numerical exercise is not designed to replicate key features in the data, but
to simply provide guidance regarding the robustness of our main insights to nonlinear utility
in consumption. A novel feature of defaulting in this environment with commitment to fiscal
policies is that it allows for a resetting of taxes. While in our economy after every default episode
the fiscal authority has the chance eventually to review and reset its tax policy, in the AMSS
model this is not the case, as the government is bound by previous marginal utility promises
when uc 6= 1. Consequently, fiscal policy will tend to exhibit even more history dependence in
the latter environment, as manifested, for example, in high and persistent taxes in states with
high indebtedness as the economy hovers around the ad hoc borrowing limits.
As illustrated in figure 6.7, even when the household is risk averse to consumption fluctua-
tions, the positive relationship between tax volatility and average default risk is observed in the
simulations. Additionally, both statistics are higher for high debt. Not surprisingly, debt-to-
output ratios are again lower on average in our economy than in the AMSS model, as shown in
figure 6.8. Finally, in figure 6.9 we present the dynamics of our model around default episodes.
In contrast with the quasi-linear case, we do not conduct the counterfactual exercise computing
the tax dynamics should the government were not allowed to default. The reason is simple: the
marginal utility promised in the period before the default announcement, i.e. t = −1, is state-
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Figure 6.7: Standard deviation of tax rates and mean bond spreads in financial access for low
debt (blue) and high debt (red), and fitted OLS line between them (black line) in economy with
aversion to consumption risk.
contingent and captures the fact that at t = 0, upon the government expenditure realization,
default occurs and hence the marginal utility corresponds to the financial autarky one. This
autarkic marginal utility is not necessarily an equilibrium object when the government repays,
i.e. it may not belong to Ω(1, B0, g0, 1, 1). As implied by the dynamics of the median and per-
centile bands of g in the top panel, all default episodes occur upon two consecutive realizations
of the highest government expenditure. In the second and bottom panels we see that taxes are
higher on average in our economy than in AMSS, and, more relevant, they grow faster during
the periods of financial access preceding the default announcement.
7 Conclusion
Our model extends the results on optimal taxation under incomplete markets results to environ-
ments where the government can default on its debt. We study how default risk and the actual
default event affect tax policies and vice-versa. By defaulting the government avoids higher tax
distortions in the future that would come along with the service of the debt. The presence of
default risk, however, gives rise to endogenous credit limits that hinder the government’s ability
to smooth shocks using debt. As a result, taxes are more volatile and less serially correlated
than in the standard incomplete market setting. We view our model as a suitable framework to
study government policies for economies that are (or were) prone to default and to restructure
their debt. Some examples throughout history include France and the U.S. in the 18th century,
and emerging economies nowadays.
Our model also provides a novel device that allows us to study asset prices of domestic debt
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Figure 6.8: Histograms of debt-to-output ratio for our model (solid red) and AMSS (dotted
blue) conditioned on different values of g for an economy with aversion to consumption risk.
From top to bottom: low, intermediate and high realization of g.
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Figure 6.9: Default episode windows in model simulations for economy with aversion to con-
sumption risk. Top panel: Cross-sectional medians of government expenditure. Middle panel:
actual tax rates (solid) in our economy. Bottom panel: tax rates in AMSS. Dashed lines corre-
spond to 25 and 75th-percentile bands.
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both during periods of financial access and autarky. Further research could fully explore the
pricing implications of this device for general government bonds held by uncertainty or risk
averse creditors. In addition, our reduced-form debt restructuring process could be used to
study more in detail some observed features in recent debt renegotiation episodes.
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Appendix
A Notation and Stochastic Structure of the Model
Throughout the appendix for a generic mapping f from a set S to T , we use s 7→ f(s) or f : S → T to
denote it. For the case that a mapping depends on many variables, the notation s1 7→ f(s1, s2) is used
to denote the function f only as a function of s1, keeping s2 fixed. Also, for a generic set A, |A| denotes
the cardinality of A.
B Optimization Problem for the Households
The Lagrangian associated to the household’s problem is given by
L({ct, nt, bt+1, νt, µt, ψt}∞t=0) ≡
∞∑
t=0
βtEΠ(·|ω0)
[{
u(ct(ω
t), 1− nt(ωt))
−νt(ωt){ct(ωt)− (1− τt(ωt))κt(ωt)nt(ωt) + pt(ωt)bt+1(ωt)− %t(ωt)bt(ωt−1)}
+ Ψt(ω
t)ct(ω
t) + ψ1t(bt+1(ω
t)− b) + ψ2t(b− bt+1(ωt))
}]
,
where νt and Ψt are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget constraint and to the non-negativity
restrictions for consumption, and ψit i = 1, 2 are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the debt limits.
Assuming interiority of the solutions, the first order conditions (FONC) are given by:
ct(ω
t) : uc(ct(ω
t), 1− nt(ωt))− νt(ωt) = 0
nt(ω
t) : − ul(ct(ωt), 1− nt(ωt)) + νt(ωt)(1− τt(ωt))κt(ωt) = 0
bt+1(ω
t) : pt(ω
t)νt(ω
t)− EΠ(·|ωt)[βνt+1(ωt+1)%t+1(ωt+1)] = 0.
Then, using uj(ω
t) for uj(ct(ω), 1− nt(ω)) with j ∈ {c, l}, it follows
ul(ω
t)
uc(ωt)
= (1− τt(ωt))κt(ωt), (B.24)
pt(ω
t) = EΠ(·|ωt)
[
β
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
%t+1(ω
t+1)
]
. (B.25)
From the definition of %, equation B.25 implies, for φt = 1 ,
pt(ω
t) = EΠ(·|ωt)
[
β
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
(1− dt+1(ω))
]
+ EΠ(·|ωt)
[
β
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
dt+1(ω
t+1)qt+1(ω
t+1)
]
.
For φt = 0, (where in this case recall that pt = qt)
pt(ω
t) = λEΠ(·|ωt)
[
β
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
at+1(ω
t+1)δt+1
]
+EΠ(·|ωt)
[
β
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
{1− λ+ λ(1− at+1(ωt+1))}qt+1(ωt+1)
]
.
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C Proofs for Section 3.2
The next lemma characterizes the set of competitive equilibria as a sequence of restrictions involving
FONC and budget constraints. The proof is relegated to the end of the section.
Lemma C.1. Suppose assumption 3.1 holds. The tuple (ct, gt, nt, bt+1, pt)
∞
t=0 and σ is a competitive
equilibrium iff given a B0 = b0, for all ω
t ∈ Ωt, for all t,
ct(ω
t) = κt(ω
t)nt(ω
t)− gt, and Bt+1(ωt) = bt+1(ωt), (C.26)
κt(ω
t)τt(ω
t) =
(
κt(ω
t)− ul(ω
t)
uc(ωt)
)
, (C.27)
Zt(ω
t) + φt(ω
t){pt(ωt)Bt+1(ωt)− δtBt(ωt)} ≥ 0, (C.28)
where
pt(ω
t) = EΠ(·|ωt)
[
β
uc(ω
t+1)
uc(ωt)
%t+1(ω
t+1)
]
, (C.29)
and if φt(ω
t) = 0, Bt+1(ω
t) = Bt(ω
t−1).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We now show the “⇒” direction. Consider an outcome path (dt, at, Bt+1, nt)∞t=0
that is consistent. This means by lemma C.1 that the tuple (ct, gt, nt, bt+1, pt)
∞
t=0 and σ is a competitive
equilibrium iff given a B0 = b0, for all ω
t ∈ Ωt, for all t, equations C.26, C.27, C.28 and C.29 hold.
Equations C.27 and C.29 imply equations 3.4-3.5. Equations C.27-C.29 imply condition 3.9.
We now show the “⇐” direction. Suppose now that the outcome path satisfies, for all ωt ∈ Ωt,
the following equations: 2.1, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.9. By using Bt+1(ω
t) = bt+1(ω
t), equations 3.4, 3.5 and
the feasibility condition, we can enlarge the outcome path by (ct, pt, bt+1, τt, gt)
∞
t=0. Clearly, restrictions
C.26, C.27 and C.29 hold. By replacing equations 3.4 and 3.5 on 3.9, it is easy to see that equation C.27
holds too.
C.1 Proofs of Supplementary Lemmas
For the proof of Lemma C.1 we need the following lemma (the proof is relegated to the end of the section).
Lemma C.2. Suppose assumption 3.1 holds. Then first order conditions 3.4 and 3.5 are also sufficient.
Proof of Lemma C.1. Take σ and (ct, gt, nt, bt+1)
∞
t=0, and a price schedule (pt)t that satisfy the equations.
It is easy to see that feasibility and market clearing holds (conditions 3 and 4). Also, by lemma C.2
optimality of the households is also satisfied.
To check attainability of the government policy (condition 2), observe that equations C.26 - C.28
imply for all ωt ∈ Ωt,
gt + φt(ω
t)δtBt(ω
t−1)− φt(ωt)pt(ωt)Bt+1(ωt) ≤ κt(ωt)τt(ωt)nt(ωt).
Finally, we check optimality of the households. We first check that the sequences satisfy the budget
constraint. Observe that by equations C.26 - C.28
−ct(ωt) + κt(ωt)nt(ωt) + φt(ωt){δtBt(ωt−1)− pt(ωt)Bt+1(ωt)} ≤ κt(ωt)τt(ωt)nt(ωt).
If φt(ω
t) = 1, then equation C.28 implies that bt+1(ω
t) = Bt+1(ω
t) for all t (and for b0 we assume it
is equal to B0) and thus
− ct(ωt) + κt(ωt)nt(ωt) + δtbt(ωt−1)− pt(ωt)bt+1(ωt) ≤ κt(ωt)τt(ωt)nt(ωt).
This coincides with the budget constraint of the household.
If dt(ω
t) = 1, but at(ω
t) = 0, equations C.26 and C.28 imply that bt(ω
t−1) = bt+1(ωt) = 0 for all t,
so −ct(ωt) + κt(ωt)nt(ωt) = κt(ωt)τt(ωt)nt(ωt), which is the budget constraint of the household.
Take σ and (ct, gt, nt, bt+1, pt)
∞
t=0 being a competitive equilibrium. Then it is easy to see that it satisfies
the equations.
38
Proof of Lemma C.2. Under assumption 3.1 the objective function of the household optimization problem
is strictly concave. The budget constraints and debt constraint form a convex set of constraints. Thus, if
the transversality condition holds, the FONC are sufficient; this follows from a simple adaptation of the
results in Stokey et al. [1989] Ch. 4.5.
In order to verify the transversality condition, it suffices to show that for any ζt(ω
t) such that
bt(ω
t) + ζt(ω
t) ∈ B,
lim
T→∞
βTEΠ[uc(κT (ω
T )nT (ω
T )− gT , 1− nT (ωT ))%T (ωT )ζT (ωT )] = 0,
which follows from Magill and Quinzii [1994] Theorem 5.2 as debt is constrained by assumption.
D Proofs for Section 4
In this section we provide formal definitions of the sets S(h0, φ) and Ω(h0, φ) introduced in the recursive
representation of the government problem. We also provide the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Formal definition of S(h0, φ0). For any h0 ∈ H and φ0 ∈ {0, 1}, let
S(h0, φ0) ≡
{
γ : ∀ (ht, φt) ∈ Ht × {0, 1}, γ|(ht,φt) renders (dτ (γ), aτ (γ), Bτ+1(γ), nτ (γ))∞τ=t ∈ CEφt(ωt, B),
with B = (δtφt + (1− φt))Bt(γ)(ht−1, φt−1(γ)(ht−1))
}
.
Analogously to Chang [1998], by drawing the strategies γ from S(h0, φ0) we ensure that after any
history following (h0, φ0) the continuation strategy delivers competitive equilibrium allocations. As it
will become clearer later on, when making the default/repayment decision embedded in φ0, the default
authority evaluates welfare after his alternative courses of action. To then compute the utility for any
φ0, the candidate strategies γ to be considered have to belong to the corresponding S(h0, φ0).44
Formal definition of Ω(h0, φ). Recall that for autarky (φ = 0), the “promised” marginal utilities
of consumption are trivially pinned down by the choice of labor that balances the government budget
and maximizes the per-period payoff; i.e., for any g ∈ G, the “promised” marginal utility of consumption
equals mA(g) ≡ uc(κn∗0(g)− g, 1− n∗0(g)) where45
n∗0(g) = arg max
n∈[0,1]
{u(κn− g, 1− n) : z(κ, n, g) = 0}.
We now proceed to formally define our object of interest. For any h0 = (φ−1, B0, g0, δ0) ∈ H and
φ ∈ {0, 1}, let
Ω(h0, φ) = {(µ, v) ∈ R+ × R : ∃ γ ∈ S(h0, φ), and (Vτ (hτ , 0), Vτ (hτ , 1))hτ ,τ such that :
µ = mA(g) if φ = 0, and µ = uc(n0(γ)(h0)− g0, 1− n0(γ)(h0)) if φ = 1,
v = V0(h0, φ)
(Vτ (h
τ , φ))hτ ,τ satisfies expression 4.10 for any φ ∈ {0, 1},
γD|h0,φ1(γ) are determined by expressions 4.11− 4.12
}
,
44Technically, it could be the case that φt = 1 but the debt that period is too high to be repaid in the competitive
equilibrium. For this case, we simply set the per-period payoff at an arbitrary large negative value and thus ensure
that this choice of φt will never arise as part of the optimal solution of the government problem.
45The lemma D.1(1) ensures that n∗0(g) exists and is unique for all g.
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For each initial history h0 and φ, the set Ω(h0, φ) is given by all the values for marginal utility
and lifetime utility values at time zero that can be sustained in a competitive equilibrium, wherein the
default authority reacts optimally from next period on. Each pair (µ, v) imposes restrictions on the labor
allocation at time 0 as well as on the lifetime utility at time 0, given h0 and φ. Finally, note that the
set Ω(h0, φ) when φ is the value chosen by the government, contains the promised marginal utilities (and
utility values) that can be delivered along the equilibrium path, while Ω(h0, φ) when φ is the value not
chosen by the government, contains off-equilibrium marginal utilities.
The correspondence Ω is an equilibrium object, endogenously determined, that can be computed using
numerical methods as the largest fixed point of an appropriately constructed correspondence operator,
in the spirit of Abreu et al. [1990]. Henceforth, we proceed to formulate and solve the recursive problem
of the fiscal authority as if we already know Ω.
Proof of theorem 4.1 The next lemma characterizes the government surplus function, the proof is
relegated to the end of this section.
Lemma D.1. Let (κ, n, g) 7→ z(κ, n, g) =
(
κ− ul(n−g,1−n)uc(n−g,1−n)
)
n− g. Then:
1. arg maxn∈[0,1]{u(κn− g, 1− n) : z(κ, n, g) = 0} exists and is unique.
2. Suppose assumption 5.1 holds and let n¯(g) = arg maxn∈[0,1] z(1, n, g). Then, n 7→ z(1, n, g) is
decreasing and strictly concave for all n ∈ [n¯(g), 1]
To show theorem 4.1 we need the following lemma whose proof is relegated to the end of this section.
Lemma D.2. If, for any h0 = (1, B, g, δ) ∈ H and φ0 ∈ {0, 1}, γ ∈ S(h0, φ0), then γ|ht,φ ∈ S(ht, φ) for
any ht ∈ Ht and φ ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover,
z(κφ0 , n0(γ)(h0), g)µ0(γ)(h0) + φ0{Pφ0(g,B1(γ)(h0, φ0), µ1(γ)(h0, h1(·)))B1(γ)(h0, φ0)− δµ0(γ)(h0)B} ≥ 0
where κφ = κ(1− φ) + φ and h1(·) ≡ (1, B1(γ)(h0, 1), ·, 1) and for t = 0, 1
µt+1(γ)(h
t, ht+1(g
′)) = uc(nt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′))− g′, 1− nt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′)))
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is analogous to the standard proof of the principle of optimality for the
single agent case, e.g. Theorem 9.2 in Stokey et al. [1989].
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By definition of V ∗1 , V
∗
0 and V
∗
1, it follows that with h0 = (φ−1, B, g, δ¯) and φ = 0
V ∗0 (g,B) = sup
γ
V0(γ)(h0, 0) (D.30)
subject to γ = (γF ,γD) ∈ S(h0, 0) (D.31)
γD|h0,φ=0 are determined by (4.12)− (4.11) (D.32)
uc(κn0(γ)(h0)− g, 1− n0(γ)(h0)) = mA(g) (D.33)
and similarly, with h0 = (1, B, g, 1) and µ ∈ R+ and φ0 = 1
V ∗1 (g,B, µ) = sup
γ
V0(γ)(h0, 1) (D.34)
subject to γ = (γF ,γD) ∈ S(h0, 1) (D.35)
γD|h0,φ=1 are determined by (4.12)− (4.11) (D.36)
uc(n0(γ)(h0)− g, 1− n0(γ)(h0)) = µ. (D.37)
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Finally, with h0 = (0, B, g, δ) and φ0 = 1
V
∗
1(g, δB) = sup
γ
V0(γ)(h0, 1) (D.38)
subject to γ = (γF ,γD) ∈ S(h0, 1) (D.39)
γD|h0,φ=1 are determined by (4.12)− (4.11). (D.40)
The first (sequential) problem consists of selecting γ, consistent with competitive equilibrium and
optimality for the default authority from t = 1 on, to maximize the lifetime utility of households, con-
ditional on h0 = (φ−1, B, g, δ) and φ = 0. The solution is given by V ∗0 (g,B), which does not depend on
δ nor µ. Condition D.33 ensures that the current marginal utility is equal to the autarkic value defined
before.
Problem D.34 is analogous to Problem D.30 with φ = 1 and φ−1 = 1 instead. In this case, we impose
through condition D.37 that the current marginal utility is µ.
Henceforth, we refer to strategies that satisfy the restrictions on the above programs as admissible.
We also assume that the suprema are achieved; this assumption is to ease the exposition, if this were not
the case the proof still goes through by exploiting the definition of the supremum.
By definition, V
∗
1(g, δB) ≥ V0(γ)(0, B, g, δ, 1) for all γ ∈ S(0, B, g, δ, 1) and γD|h0,φ=1 are deter-
mined by (4.12)-(4.11). By definition of Ω(0, B, g, δ, 1), this implies that for all (µ, v) ∈ Ω(0, B, g, δ, 1),
V
∗
1(g, δB) ≥ v. On the other hand, assuming that the there exists a strategy γ that achieves the supre-
mum, it has to be true that there exists a µ such that (µ, V
∗
1(g, δB)) ∈ Ω(0, B, g, δ, 1). Therefore,
V
∗
1(g, δB) = max{v|(µ, v) ∈ Ω(0, B, g, δ, 1)}. (D.41)
It is easy to see that the same result applies for any time t and any history (ht, 0, B, g, δ) (not just
t = 0 and h0 = (0, B, g, δ)).
Let h0 ≡ (φ−1, B, g, δ) and φ = 0. Suppose that there exists a strategy γˆ that achieves the supremum
in program D.30. Then,46
V ∗0 (g,B) =u(κn0(γˆ)(g)− g, 1− n0(γˆ)(g))
+ βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
max{V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, (g′, δ′), 1), V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, (g′, δ′), 0)}pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|g)
+ β(1− λ)
∫
G
V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, (g
′, δ), 0)piG(dg′|g).
Observe that, for any g′ ∈ G, V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, (g′, δ′), 0) is constant with respect to δ′. Also, note that
γˆ|h1,φ is admissible by lemma D.2. It also follows that V1(γ)(h0, 0, B, (g′, δ′), 0) = V0(γ)(0, B, (g′, δ′), 0)
for any strategy γ and any (h0, g
′, δ′). Thus
V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, (g
′, δ¯), 0) = V ∗0 (g
′, B), ∀g′ ∈ G. (D.42)
Therefore,
V ∗0 (g,B) =u(κn0(γˆ)(g)− g, 1− n0(γˆ)(g)) (D.43)
+ βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
max{V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, (g′, δ′), 1), V ∗0 (g′, B)}pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|g)
+ β(1− λ)
∫
G
V ∗0 (g
′, B)piG(dg′|g).
46Henceforth we abuse notation and use n0(γ)(g) instead of n0(γ)(h0).
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By construction, n0(γˆ)(g) = n
∗
0(g) and thus,
V ∗0 (g,B) =u(κn
∗
0(g)− g, 1− n∗0(g))
+ βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
max{V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, (g′, δ′), 1), V ∗0 (g′, B)}pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|g)
+ β(1− λ)
∫
G
V ∗0 (g
′, B)piG(dg′|g).
Observe that at (h0, φ0 = 0, B, g
′, δ′, φ1 = 1) a “new” fiscal authority begins at time t = 1. By
construction, this fiscal authority starts without binding promises regarding the marginal utility of con-
sumption. Since γˆ is optimal, it follows that V1(γˆ)(h0, 0, B, g
′, δ′, 1) = V
∗
1(g
′, δ′B). Therefore,
V ∗0 (g,B) =u(κn
∗
0(g)− g, 1− n∗0(g)) + βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
max{V ∗1(g′, δ′B), V ∗0 (g′, B)}pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|g)
+ β(1− λ)
∫
G
V ∗0 (g
′, B)piG(dg′|g).
We now consider program D.34. With an slight abuse of notation, let γˆ be the strategy that achieves
the supremum in program D.34. Henceforth, let µt(γ)(h
t) ≡ uc(nt(γ)(ht) − gt, 1 − nt(γ)(ht)) for any
strategy γ and history ht ∈ Ht. Observe that, for h1 = (1, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), (g′, 1)), due to lemma D.2, γˆ|h1,φ
is admissible (taking µ as µ1(γˆ)(h
1)), because γˆ|h1,φ ∈ S(h1, φ), and also γD|h1,φ=1 are determined by
expressions 4.12-4.11. Thus
V1(γˆ)(h0, h1, 1) ≤ V ∗1 (g′, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), µ1(γˆ)(h1)) and V1(γˆ)(h0, h1, 0) ≤ V ∗0 (g′, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1)).
Therefore, letting h1(g′) = (1, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), (g′, 1))),
V ∗1 (g, δB, µ) ≤u(n0(γˆ)(g)− g, 1− n0(γˆ)(g))
+ β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), µ1(γˆ)(h1(g′))), V ∗0 (g′, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1))}piG(dg′|g).
By lemma D.2, (n0(γˆ)(g), B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), µ1(γˆ)(h
1(·)))) are such that uc(n0(γˆ)(g)−g, 1−n0(γˆ)(g)) = µ
and
z(1, n0(γˆ)(g), g)µ+ P∗1 (g,B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), µ1(γˆ)(h1(·))B1(γˆ)(h0, 1) ≥ Bµ.
Therefore,
V ∗1 (g,B, µ) ≤ max
(n′,B′,µ′(·))∈Γ(g,B,µ)
u(n− g, 1− n) + β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B′, µ′(g′)), V ∗0 (g′, B′)}piG(dg′|g).
We now show that the reversed inequality holds:
V ∗1 (g,B, µ) =u(n0(γˆ)(g)− g, 1− n0(γˆ)(g))
+β
∫
G
max{V1(γˆ)(h0, 1, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), (g′, 1), 1), V1(γˆ)(h0, 1, B1(γˆ)(h0, 1), (g′, 1), 0)}piG(dg′|g)
≥u(n0(γ)(g)− g, 1− n0(γ)(g))
+β
∫
G
max{V1(γ)(h0, 1, B1(γ)(h0, 1), (g′, 1), 1), V1(γ)(h0, 1, B1(γ)(h0, 1), (g′, 1), 0)}piG(dg′|g)
(D.44)
where h0 = (1, B, g, 1) and the second line holds for any γ admissible.
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For this we construct the following strategy γ˜: (1) γ˜D are determined by expressions 4.12-4.11; (2)
for any φ and h1, γ˜
F (h0, φ) = B1(γ˜)(h0, φ) and µ1(γ˜)(h
1) are such that
z(1, n0(γ˜)(g), g)µ+ φ{P∗1 (g,B1(γ˜)(h0, 1), µ1(γ˜)(h0, ◦))B1(γ˜)(h0, 1)−Bµ} ≥ 0, (D.45)
where ◦ stands for (1, B1(γ˜)(h0, φ), (·, φ)), and B1(γ˜)(h0, φ) = B and µ1(γ˜)(h1) = mA(g′) if φ = 0;
(3) the remaining components of the strategy γ˜F agree with γˆF , i.e., γ˜F |h1,φ = γˆF |h1,φ for all history
h1 ∈ H1 and φ ∈ {0, 1}.
We now verify that γ˜ is admissible, which boils down to proving that γ˜ ∈ S(h0, 1). Observe that
by our construction (n0(γ˜)(g), B1(γ˜)(h0, 1)) satisfy the implementability constraint (equation D.45) at
time t = 0 for a price given by P∗1 (g,B1(γ˜)(h0, 1), µ1(γ˜)(h0, ◦)) and it satisfies that B1(γ˜)(h0, 0) = B.
Additionally, from lemma D.2, γˆ|h1,φ ∈ S(h1, φ), so these two results imply that γ˜ ∈ S(h0, 1).
Also for any h1 ∈ H2 and φ ∈ {0, 1} with h1 = (1, B1(γ˜)(h0, 1), g′, 1), since γˆ|h1,φ ∈ S(h1, φ),
it follows that V1(γˆ)(h
1, 1) = V ∗1 (g
′, B1(γ˜)(h0, 1), µ1(γ˜)(h1)) and V1(γˆ)(h1, 0) = V ∗0 (g
′, B1(γ˜)(h0, 1)),
otherwise there would be an admissible strategy that achieves a higher value for V0(·)(h0, φ) than γˆ.
Hence, evaluating display D.44 at γ˜, it follows that
V ∗1 (g,B, µ) ≥u(n0(γ˜)(g)− g, 1− n0(γ˜)(g))
+ β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B1(γ˜)(h0, 1), µ1(γ˜)(h0, h1(g′))), V ∗0 (g′, B1(γ˜)(h0, 1))}piG(dg′|g)
where h1(g
′) stands for (1, B1(γ˜)(h0, 1), (g′, 1)). Since (n0(γ˜)(h0), B1(γ˜)(h0, 1), µ1(γ˜)(h1)) are arbitrary
(other than the fact that they belong to Γ(g,B, µ)), it follows that
V ∗1 (g,B, µ) ≥ max
(n,B′,µ′(·)∈Γ(g,δB,µ)
u(n− g, 1− n) + β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B′, µ′(g′)), V ∗0 (g′, B′)}piG(dg′|g).
D.1 Proofs of Supplementary Lemmas
Proof of Lemma D.1. (1) Under assumption assumption 3.1, n 7→ u′(κn − g, 1 − n) = uc(κn − g) −
ul(1 − n) = 1 − (1 − τ)κ and since κ < 1 and τ ∈ [0, 1] it implies that u′(κn − g, 1 − n) > 0. Also,
n 7→ u(κn− g, 1−n) is continuous. Moreover, {n : z(κ, n, g) = 0} = {n : κ(uc(n− g, 1−n)−ul(n− g, 1−
n))n−uc(n−g, 1−n)g = 0}. Under assumption 3.1, uc and ul are continuous, and thus this set is closed
(and bounded). Therefore it is compact. By the theorem of the maximum arg maxn∈[0,1]{u(κn−g, 1−n) :
z(κ, n, g) = 0} exists. Uniqueness follows from the fact that n 7→ u(κn− g, 1− n) is increasing.
(2) First observe that n 7→ z(1, n, g) = (1 − H ′(1 − n))n − g (with uc = 1) is continuous and
thus n¯(g) exists for all g ∈ G (G is such that for all g ∈ G, maxn∈[0,1] z(1, n, g) ≥ g). Observe that
n 7→ z′(1, n, g) = (1 − H ′(1 − n)) + H ′′(1 − n)n and n 7→ z′′(1, n, g) = 2H ′′(1 − n) − H ′′′(1 − n)n. By
assumption 5.1, z′′(1, n, g) < 0 and thus is strictly concave. We now show that z is decreasing. If n¯(g) = 1
then the statement is vacuous, so consider n¯(g) < 1. Since n¯(g) is the “argmax”, z′(1, n¯(g), g) ≤ 0. Since
z is strictly concave, z′ is a decreasing, hence z′(1, n, g) < z′(1, n¯(g), g) ≤ 0 for all n > n¯(g), and the
result follows.
Proof of Lemma D.2. If γ ∈ S(h0, φ0) it follows that, for any public history ht with ht = (φt−1, Bt, ωt =
(gt, δt)) with Bt = Bt(γ)(h
t−1, φ) and any φ ∈ {0, 1},
z(κφ, nt(γ)(h
t), gt)uc(ω
t) + φ{pt(ωt)uc(ωt)Bt+1(γ)(ht, φ)− δtuc(ωt)Bt} ≥ 0
and Bt+1(γ)(h
t, 0) = Bt,
pt(ω
t)uc(ω
t) =β
∫
G
dt+1(γ)(h
t, ht+1(g
′))µt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′))piG(dg′|gt)
+ β
∫
G
(1− dt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′)))mA(g′)qt+1(ωt, δ¯, g′)piG(dg′|gt) (D.46)
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where ht+1(g
′) ≡ (1, Bt+1(γ)(ht, 1), g′, 1) and
µt+1(γ)(h
t, ht+1(g
′)) = uc(nt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′))− g′, 1− nt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′)))
and qt is the “secondary market” price at time t, i.e.,
qt+1(ω
t+1, δ¯, g) ≡βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
at+1(γ)(h
t, ht+1(g
′, δ′))µt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′, δ′))δ′pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|g) (D.47)
+ β
∫
G
(
1− λ+ λ
∫
∆
(1− at+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(g′, δ′)))pi∆(dδ′)
)
mA(g
′)qt+2(ωt+1, δ¯, g′)piG(dg′|g)
with ht+1(g
′, δ′) = (0, δ′Bt+1(γ)(ht, 1), g′, δ′).
From equation D.46 it follows that pt(ω
t)uc(ω
t) = P1(gt, Bt+1(γ)(ht, 1), µt+1(γ)(ht, ht+1(·))) and
from equation D.47 qt+1(ω
t, δ¯, g′) = P0(g′, Bt+1(γ)(ht, 1)). Also, from these equations and the first
display it is clear that if γ ∈ S(h0, φ0), then γ|ht,φ ∈ S(φt−1, Bt, ωt, φ).
E Proofs for Section 5
In order to show proposition 5.1, we need the following lemmas (whose proofs are relegated to the end of
this section). Throughout this section we assume that assumption 5.1 holds.
Throughout this section, let
Γφ(g,B) = {(n,B′) : z(κφ, n, g) + φ(P∗φ(g,B′)B′ −B) ≥ 0 and B′ = B if φ = 0}
with κφ ≡ φ+ κ(1− φ).
Lemma E.1. There exists a constant ∞ > C > 0, such that |V ∗φ (g,B)| ≤ C for all (φ, g,B) such that
Γφ(g,B) 6= {∅}.
Lemma E.2. B 7→ V ∗1 (g,B) is non-increasing for all g ∈ G.47
Lemma E.3. There exists a C > 0, such that maxg′∈G maxB1,B2∈B2 |V ∗0 (g′, B1)− V ∗0 (g′, B2)| ≤ λ βC1−β .
The previous lemma implies that, for any  > 0, there exists a λ() > 0 such that, for any λ ∈ [0, λ()]
max
g′∈G
max
B1,B2∈B2
|V ∗0 (g′, B1)− V ∗0 (g′, B2)| ≤ . (E.48)
Lemma E.4. There exists λ¯ > 0 such that for all λ ∈ [0, λ¯], the following holds: For all (g,B) such that
B > 0 and d∗(g,B) = 1, P∗1 (g,B′)B′ ≤ B for all B′ ∈ B.
We observe that for each B ∈ B, P∗0 is the fixed point of the following mapping
q 7→T ∗B [q](·)
=λβ
∫
G×∆
a∗(g′, δ′, B)δ′pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|·) + β
∫
G
(
(1− λ) + λ
∫
∆
(1− a∗(g′, δ′, B))pi∆(dδ′)
)
q(g′)piG(dg′|·)
=λβ
∫
G×∆
a∗(g′, δ′, B)δ′pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′|·) + β
∫
G
(
1− λ
∫
∆
a∗(g′, δ′, B)pi∆(dδ′)
)
q(g′)piG(dg′|·)
for any B ∈ B, and q ∈ {f : G→ R uniformly bounded}. We use this insight to derive properties of P∗0 .
47This result clearly implies that δ 7→ V ∗1 (g, δB) is non-decreasing for all g ∈ G and B > 0.
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Lemma E.5. Suppose assumption 5.1 holds. Then:
1. For each B ∈ B, T ∗B is a contraction.
2. For any (g,B) ∈ G× B, P∗0 (g,B) ∈
[
0, λ β1−βEpi∆ [δ]
]
.
3. If g is iid (distributed according to piG(·)), then P∗0 (g,B) is constant in g and given by
P∗0 (g,B) =
λβ
∫
G×∆ a
∗(g′, δ′, B)δ′pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′)
1− β + βλ ∫G×∆ a∗(g′, δ′, B)pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′)
and in this case |P∗0 (g,B)| ≤ βλ1−β+βλ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Part (1). By lemma E.2, δ 7→ V ∗1 (g, δB) is non-increasing, provided B > 0
(but this is the only case it matters since the government will never default on savings B < 0). On the
other hand V ∗0 (g,B) is constant with respect to δ. Therefore if for some δ ∈ ∆, a∗(g, δ, B) = 1, then for
all δ1 ≤ δ the same must hold. Thus, there exists a δˆ : G× B→ [0, 1] such that
a∗(g, δ, B) = 1{δ:δ≤δˆ(g,B)}(δ). (E.49)
We now show that B 7→ δˆ(g,B) is non-increasing, for all g ∈ G. It suffices to show that for any δ
such that δ > δˆ(g,B1) then δ > δˆ(g,B2) for any B1 < B2.
Since δ > δˆ(g,B1), it follows that V
∗
1 (g, δB1) < V
∗
0 (g,B1). Let (g,B1, δ) ≡ V ∗0 (g,B1)− V ∗1 (g, δB1).
It is easy to see that (g,B1, δ) > 0 for any (g,B1, δ) such that δ > δˆ(g,B1). Moreover, since g, B1
and δ belong to discrete sets, there exists a  > 0 such that  ≤ (g,B1, δ) for all (g,B1, δ) such that
δ > δˆ(g,B1).
Since B 7→ V ∗1 (g,B) is non-increasing (see lemma E.2) for any g ∈ G, it follows that V ∗1 (g, δB2) ≤
V ∗1 (g, δB1) for all (g, δ) ∈ G×∆ (observe that δ > 0 always). Therefore,
V ∗1 (g, δB2)− V ∗0 (g,B2) ≤V ∗1 (g, δB1)− V ∗0 (g,B2) ≤ V ∗1 (g, δB1)− V ∗0 (g,B1) + {V ∗0 (g,B1)− V ∗0 (g,B2)},
for all (g,B1, B2, δ) such that δ > δˆ(g,B1).
Hence, if |V ∗0 (g,B1)−V ∗0 (g,B2)| <  for any (g,B1, B2), the previous display implies that V ∗1 (g, δB2)−
V ∗0 (g,B2) < 0 and the desired result follows. We now show that |V ∗0 (g,B1) − V ∗0 (g,B2)| <  for any
(g,B1, B2). By lemma E.3, there exists a C > 0 such that |V ∗0 (g,B1)− V ∗0 (g,B2)| < λ βC1−β , ∀(B1, B2, g).
Thus for any ε > 0, there exists a λ(ε), such that |V ∗0 (g,B1) − V ∗0 (g,B1)| < ε for all λ ∈ [0, λ(ε)]. By
setting ε =  and λ¯ = λ(), the desired result follows.
Part (2). Following Arellano [2008] we show the result in two steps. Throughout the proof n∗φ and B
∗
are the optimal policy functions for labor and debt.
Step 1. We show that for any B1 < B2, S(B1) ⊆ S(B2) where S(B) = {g : d∗(g,B) = 1}.
If S(B1) = {∅} the proof is trivial, so we proceed with the case in which this does not hold and let
g¯ ∈ S(B1). If B2 is not feasible, in the sense that there does not exist any B′ such that B2−P∗1 (g;B′)B′−
maxn∈[0,1] z(1, n, g¯) ≤ 0, then S(B2) = G. And the result holds trivially, so we proceed with the case that
B2 is feasible, given g¯.
It follows (since we assume that under indifference, the government chooses not to default) V ∗1 (g¯, B1) <
V ∗0 (g¯, B1). Since B 7→ V ∗1 (g¯, B) is non-increasing (see lemma E.2), it follows that
V ∗1 (g¯, B2) ≤ V ∗1 (g¯, B1), for all B1 < B2.
Therefore,
V ∗1 (g¯, B2)− V ∗0 (g¯, B2) ≤V ∗1 (g¯, B1)− V ∗0 (g¯, B2) ≤ V ∗1 (g¯, B1)− V ∗0 (g¯, B1) + {V ∗0 (g¯, B1)− V ∗0 (g¯, B2)}.
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Let (g¯, B1) ≡ −{V ∗1 (g¯, B1) − V ∗0 (g¯, B1)}, observe that (g¯, B1) > 0 for any (B1, g¯) ∈ Graph{S}. Thus,
if V ∗0 (g¯, B1)− V ∗0 (g¯, B2) < (g¯, B1), then V ∗1 (g¯, B2) < V ∗0 (g¯, B2) and the desired result follows.
Observe that |B × Graph(S)| < ∞, so there exists  > 0 such that  ≤ (g¯, B1) for any g¯ and B1 in
Graph(S). By lemma E.3 and our derivations in part (1), there exists a λ() > 0 such that
|V ∗0 (g,B1)− V ∗0 (g,B2)| < , ∀λ ∈ [0, λ()] and (g,B1, B2) ∈ G× B2.
Hence, V ∗1 (g¯, B2)− V ∗0 (g¯, B2) < 0, thereby implying that g¯ ∈ S(B2).
Step 2. We show that, for any B ∈ B and any g1 < g2 in G, if d∗(g1, B) = 1, then d∗(g2, B) = 1. That
is, we want to show that V ∗1 (g2, B) < V
∗
0 (g2, B). Since default occurs for g1, it suffices to show that
V ∗1 (g2, B)− V ∗0 (g2, B) < V ∗1 (g1, B)− V ∗0 (g1, B) (E.50)
or equivalently, V ∗1 (g2, B)− V ∗1 (g1, B) < V ∗0 (g2, B)− V ∗0 (g1, B). Observe that
V ∗0 (g2, B)− V ∗0 (g1, B) = r(n∗0(g2))− r(n∗0(g1))− (g2 − g1) (E.51)
where n 7→ r(n) = n+H(1− n). And now take n˜ such that
z(1, n˜, g1) = B − P∗1 (B∗(g2, B))B∗(g2, B);
i.e., n˜ is such that (n˜,B∗(g2, B)) are feasible choices given the state (g1, B), and recall z(1, n, g) ≡
(1−H ′(1−n))n− g and (g,B) 7→ B∗(g,B) is the optimal policy function for debt, when the government
has access to financial markets. Observe that if no such choice exists, then, since z(1, n˜, g1) ≥ z(1, n˜, g2),
trivially d∗(g2, B) = 1. Also, P∗1 does not depend on g because of the i.i.d. assumption. Given this
construction,
V ∗1 (g2, B)− V ∗1 (g1, B)
≤r(n∗1(g2, B))− g2 + β
∫
G
V∗(g′,B∗(g2, B))piG(dg′)−
{
r(n˜)− g1 + β
∫
G
V∗(g′,B∗(g2, B))piG(dg′)
}
=r(n∗1(g2, B))− r(n˜)− (g2 − g1)
where (g,B) 7→ V∗(g,B) ≡ max{V ∗1 (g,B), V ∗0 (g,B)}. Given this and E.51, it suffices to show that
r(n∗1(g2, B))− r(n˜) ≤ r(n∗0(g2))− r(n∗0(g1)). (E.52)
We now show this inequality. By construction of n˜,
z(1, n˜, g1) = z(1,n
∗
1(g2, B), g2) (E.53)
where (g,B) 7→ n∗1(g,B) is the optimal policy function for labor, when the government has access to
financial markets. Since n 7→ z(1, n, g) is non-increasing in the relevant domain (by relevant domain we
mean the interval of n which are in “correct side of the Laffer curve”; see lemma D.1(2)) and g1 < g2,
n˜ ≥ n∗1(g2, B). By analogous arguments, it follows that n∗0(g1) > n∗0(g2).
Also, note that
z(1, n˜, g1)− z(1,n∗0(g1), g1) = P∗1 (B∗(g2, B))B∗(g2, B) = z(1,n∗1(g2, B), g2)− z(1,n∗0(g2), g2), (E.54)
or equivalently, with n 7→ ρ(n) = (1−H ′(1− n))n
ρ(n˜)− ρ(n∗0(g1)) = ρ(n∗1(g2, B))− ρ(n∗0(g2)). (E.55)
Since n 7→ z(1, n, g) (and thus ρ) is concave and non-increasing (see lemma D.1(2)), it follows n˜ > (<
)n∗0(g1) iff n
∗
1(g2, B) > (<)n
∗
0(g2).
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Putting all these observations together, we have the following possible orders
(I) : n∗0(g1) ≥ n˜ ≥ n∗0(g2) ≥ n∗1(g2, B)
(II) : n∗0(g1) ≥ n∗0(g2) ≥ n˜ ≥ n∗1(g2, B)
(III) : n˜ ≥ n∗0(g1) ≥ n∗1(g2, B) ≥ n∗0(g2)
(IV ) : n˜ ≥ n∗1(g2, B) ≥ n∗0(g1) ≥ n∗0(g2).
Moreover, since in (g1, B) the government defaults, it follows from the proof of lemma E.4 that B −
P∗1 (B′)B′ ≥ 0 for any B′ ∈ B, in particular for B′ = B∗(g2, B). Therefore, z(1, n˜, g1) > z(1,n∗0(g1), g1),
and thus n˜ ≤ n∗0(g1), and consequently n∗1(g2, B) ≤ n∗0(g2). Hence, cases (III) and (IV) are ruled out.
We now study cases (I) and (II). Since n 7→ z(1, n, g) is strictly concave and non-increasing (see
lemma D.1), equation E.55 and (I) and (II) imply
n∗0(g1)− n˜ ≤ n∗0(g2)− n∗1(g2, B). (E.56)
Since n 7→ r(n) ≡ n+H(1−n) is concave and increasing under our assumptions, the previous inequality
implies that
r(n∗0(g1))− r(n∗0(g2)) ≤ r(n˜)− r(n∗1(g2, B)) (E.57)
for both case (I) and (II), or equivalently
r(n∗1(g2, B))− r(n˜) ≤ r(n∗0(g2))− (n∗0(g1)),
which is precisely equation E.52.
Hence, step 2 establishes that d∗ is of the threshold type, since it shows that, for any B, if d∗(g,B) = 1,
the same is true for any g′ > g. That is {g : d∗(g,B) = 1} is of the form {g : g ≥ g¯(B)}. Step 1 shows
that the g¯ ought to be non-increasing.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. We first establish the result for i = 0. From lemma E.5(3), observe that
P∗0 (B) =
βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)pi∆(dδ)piG(dg
′)
1− β + βλ ∫G ∫∆ 1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)pi∆(dδ)piG(dg′)
∫
G
∫
∆
1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)δpi∆(dδ)piG(dg
′)∫
G
∫
∆
1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)pi∆(dδ)piG(dg
′)
.
Note that the first term in the RHS is an increasing function (namely x 7→ x1−β+x ) of
βλ
∫
G
∫
∆
1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)pi∆(dδ)piG(dg
′). Since B 7→ δˆ(g,B) is non-increasing (proposition 5.1), it fol-
lows that B 7→ ∫
∆
1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)pi∆(dδ) is also non-increasing, this in turn implies that the first term in
the RHS is also non-increasing as a function of B.
By our assumption pi∆(·) = 1δ0(·), the second term in the RHS is given by∫
G
∫
∆
1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)δpi∆(dδ)piG(dg
′)∫
G
∫
∆
1{δ≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)pi∆(dδ)piG(dg
′)
= δ0
∫
G 1{δ0≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)piG(dg
′)∫
G 1{δ0≤δˆ(g′,B)}(δ)piG(dg
′)
= δ0
and thus constant. Hence, B 7→ P∗0 (B) is non-increasing.
For i = 1, observe that for any B1 ≤ B2,
P∗1 (B1) =β
∫
G
1{g′≤g¯(B1)}(g
′)piG(dg′) + β
∫
G
1{g′>g¯(B1)}(g
′)piG(dg′)P∗0 (B1)
≥β
∫
G
1{g′≤g¯(B2)}(g
′)piG(dg′) + β
∫
G
1{g′>g¯(B2)}(g
′)piG(dg′)P∗0 (B1)
≥β
∫
G
1{g′≤g¯(B2)}(g
′)piG(dg′) + β
∫
G
1{g′>g¯(B2)}(g
′)piG(dg′)P∗0 (B2)
=P∗1 (B2)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that B 7→ g¯(B) is non-increasing (proposition 5.1) and
P∗0 (B) < 1 for any B ∈ B (see lemma E.5(3)) ; the second inequality follows from the fact that P∗0 is
non-increasing.
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E.1 Proofs of Supplementary Lemmas
Proof of Lemma E.1. For any (φ−, g, δ, B) ∈ {0, 1} × G × ∆ × B, and any function (φ−, g, δ, B) 7→
F (φ−, g, δ, B) we define the following operator
T [F ](φ−, g, δ, B) = max
(a,d)∈D(φ−,δ)
T1[F ](φ−(1− d) + a(1− φ−), g, δ, ϕ(B, δ, a, d)) (E.58)
with D(0, δ) = {0, 1} × {1} if δ 6= δ¯ and D(0, δ¯) = {0} × {1}, also D(1, δ) = {1} × {0, 1}; ϕ(B, δ, a, 1) =
δBa+ (1− a)B and ϕ(B, δ, 0, d) = B; and
T1[F ](φ, g, δ, B) = max
(n,B′)∈Γφ(g,B)
{
κφn− g +H(1− n) + β
∫
G
∫
∆¯
F (φ, g′, δ′, B′)pi∆¯(dδ
′|φ)piG(dg′)
}
,
(E.59)
where pi∆¯(·|φ) = 1{1}(·) if φ = 1 and pi∆¯(·|φ) = (1− λ)1{δ¯}(·) + λpi∆(·) if φ = 0.
A fixed point of the T operator is given by
V∗(φ−, g, δ, B) = max
(a,d)∈D(φ−,δ)
V ∗φ−(1−d)+a(1−φ−)(g, ϕ(B, δ, a, d)) (E.60)
and for any φ ∈ {0, 1}
V ∗φ (g,B) = max
(n,B′)∈Γφ(g,B)
{
κφn− g +H(1− n) + β
∫
G
∫
∆¯
V∗(φ, g′, δ′, B′)pi∆¯(dδ′|φ)piG(dg′)
}
. (E.61)
To verify equation E.61, see that if φ = 0, B′ = B by the restrictions imposed on Γ0, κ0 = κ and∫
∆¯
V∗(0, g′, δ′, B′)pi∆¯(dδ′|0) =λ
∫
∆
V∗(0, g′, δ′, B)pi∆¯(dδ′) + (1− λ)V∗(0, g′, δ¯, B)
=λ
∫
∆
max
a∈{0,1}
V ∗a (g
′, B(δa+ (1− a)))pi∆¯(dδ′) + (1− λ)V∗(0, g′, δ¯, B)
=λ
∫
∆
max{V ∗1 (g′, Bδ), V ∗0 (g′, B)}pi∆¯(dδ′) + (1− λ)V ∗0 (g′, B)
where the last line follows from the fact that D(0, δ¯) = {0} × {1}. If φ = 1, then∫
∆¯
V∗(1, g′, δ′, B′)pi∆¯(dδ′|1) =V∗(1, g′, 1, B′)
= max
d∈{0,1}
V ∗(1−d)(g
′, ϕ(B′, 1, 1, d))
= max{V ∗1 (g′, ϕ(B′, 1, 0, 0)), V ∗0 (g′, ϕ(B′, 1, 0, 1))}
= max{V ∗1 (g′, B′), V ∗0 (g′, B′)}.
Observe that from this fixed point we can derive the functions V ∗ by using equation E.61.
We now show that the operator T maps bounded functions onto bounded functions. Take F such
that |F (φ−, g, δ, B)| ≤ C for all (φ−, g, δ, B) and for some finite constant C > 0. Then
|T [F ](φ−, g, δ, B)| = | max
(a,d)∈D(φ−,δ)
T1[F ](φ−(1− d) + a(1− φ−), g, δ, ϕ(B, δ, a, d))|.
If (g, δ, B) are such that Γ1(g, δB) = {∅}, then by convention, φ−(1 − d) + a(1 − φ−) = 0 (i.e., there
is default/no repayment) and thus max(a,d)∈D(φ−,δ) T1[F ](φ−(1 − d) + a(1 − φ−), g, δ, ϕ(B, δ, a, d)) =
F (0, g, δ, ϕ(B, δ, 0, 1)) = F (0, g, δ, B) and since by our assumptions over G, Γ0(g,B) 6= {∅} for any (g,B),
there exists a finite c′ > 0 such that |maxn∈Γ0(g,B) κn− g+H(1−n)| ≤ c′. This implies that in this case
|T [F ](φ−, g, δ, B)| ≤ c′ + βC.
48
Similarly, if (g, δ, B) are such that Γ1(g, δB) 6= {∅} then |maxn∈Γ1(g,δB) n− g+H(1−n)| ≤ c′ and it
follows that |T [F ](φ−, g, δ, B)| ≤ c′ + βC. Hence, by letting C = c′1−β we showed that T maps bounded
functions onto bounded functions.
The fix point V∗ inherits this property, i,.e., |V∗(φ−, g, δ, B)| ≤ C for all (φ−, g, δ, B). This result,
the fact that |maxn∈Γ0(g,B) κn− g +H(1− n)| ≤ c′ and equation E.61 implies that there exists a finite
constant C ′′ > 0, such that |V ∗0 (g,B)| ≤ C ′′. An analogous result holds for V ∗1 (g,B) provided that (g,B)
are such that Γ1(g,B) 6= {∅}.
Proof of Lemma E.2. It is easy to see that Γ1(g,B1) ⊆ Γ1(g,B2) for any B1 ≥ B2 and this immediately
implies that
V ∗1 (g,B1) = max
(n,B′)∈Γ1(g,B1)
{n− g +H(1− n) + β
∫
G
max{V ∗0 (g′, B′), V ∗1 (g′, B′)}piG(dg′)
≤ max
(n,B′)∈Γ1(g,B2)
{n− g +H(1− n) + β
∫
G
max{V ∗0 (g′, B′), V ∗1 (g′, B′)}piG(dg′)
=V ∗1 (g,B2)
and the result follows for V ∗1 .
Proof of Lemma E.3. Observe that, for any (g,B1, B2) ∈ G× B2,
|V ∗0 (g,B1)− V ∗0 (g,B2)| ≤λβ
∫
G
∫
∆
a∗(g, δ, B)|V ∗1 (g′, δB1)− V ∗1 (g′, δB2)|pi∆(dδ)piG(dg′|g)
+ β
∫
G
{(1− λ) + λ
∫
∆
(1− a∗(g, δ, B))pi∆(dδ)}|V ∗0 (g′, B1)− V ∗0 (g′, B2)|piG(dg′|g)
≤λβ
∫
G
∫
∆
a∗(g, δ, B)|V ∗1 (g′, δB1)− V ∗1 (g′, δB2)|pi∆(dδ)piG(dg′|g)
+ βmax
g′∈G
|V ∗0 (g′, B1)− V ∗0 (g′, B2)|
≤λβC + βmax
g′∈G
|V ∗0 (g′, B1)− V ∗0 (g′, B2)|
where the last line follows from lemma E.1 and the fact that if (g, δ, B) are such that Γ1(g, δB) = {∅}
then a∗(g, δ, B) = 0. Therefore,
max
g′∈G
max
B1,B2∈B2
|V ∗0 (g′, B1)− V ∗0 (g′, B2)| ≤ λ
βC
1− β .
Proof of Lemma E.4. Suppose not. That is, for any λ, there exists a (g,B) with B > 0 such that
d∗(g,B) = 1 but there exists a B′ such that P∗1 (g,B′)B′ > B.
First observe that for any (g,B,B′) such that P∗1 (g,B′)B′ > B,
z(1,n(g,B,B′), g) < z(1,n∗0(g), g)
where n(g,B,B′) is the level of labor that solves z(1, n, g) + P∗1 (g,B′)B′ = B. Since n 7→ z(1, n, g) is
non-increasing in the relevant domain (see lemma D.1(2)), it follows that n(g,B,B′) > n∗0(g), thereby
implying that the per-period payoff is greater under no default, i.e.,
r(n(g,B,B′))− g − {r(n∗0(g))− g} > 0 (E.62)
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where n 7→ r(n) = n + H(1 − n) is increasing by our assumptions. Let U ≡ {(g,B,B′) ∈ G × B2 :
equation E.62 holds}. Under our assumptions |U | <∞, so there exists a ′ > 0 such that r(n(g,B,B′))−
g − {r(n∗0(g))− g} ≥ ′ for all (g,B,B′) ∈ U . Consider any λ ∈ [0, λ(0.5′)] where  7→ λ() is such that
λ()|
∫
G
{
∫
∆
max{V ∗1 (g′, δB′)− V ∗0 (g′, B′), 0}pi∆(dδ)}piG(dg′|g)| ≤ ; (E.63)
such λ exists by lemma E.1. By our hypothesis, there exists a (g,B,B′) with B > 0 such that d∗(g,B) = 1
and P∗1 (g,B′)B′ > B. And thus (g,B,B′) ∈ U . By our choice of λ,∫
G
V ∗0 (g
′, B′)piG(dg′|g) + 0.5′ ≥
∫
G
{λ
∫
∆
max{V ∗1 (g′, δB′), V ∗0 (g′, B′)}pi∆(dδ) + (1− λ)V ∗0 (g′, B′)}piG(dg′|g).
By definition of ′ and the fact that (g,B,B′) ∈ U , it follows that
r(n(g,B,B′))− g + β
∫
G
max{V ∗1 (g′, B′), V ∗0 (g′, B′)}piG(dg′|g)
>r(n∗0(g))− g + 0.5′ + β
∫
G
V ∗0 (g
′, B′)piG(dg′|g)
≥r(n∗0(g))− g + β{
∫
G
V ∗0 (g
′, B′)piG(dg′|g) + 0.5′}
≥V ∗0 (g,B).
Since V ∗1 (g,B) is larger or equal than the LHS, we conclude that for (g,B) the government decides not
to default, but this is a contradiction to the fact that d∗(g,B) = 1.
Proof of Lemma E.5. Part 1. To show part 1 we show that for each B ∈ B, T ∗B satisfies the Blackwell
sufficient conditions. Henceforth, consider B ∈ B given, observe that T ∗B is of the form
T ∗B [q](g) = AB(g) + β
∫
G
CB(g
′)q(g′)piG(dg′|g) (E.64)
where AB(·) ≡ λ β
∫
G×∆ a
∗(g′, δ′, B) δ′ pi∆(dδ′) piG(dg′|·), and CB(g) ≡ ( ( 1− λ )+ λ
∫
∆
(1 −
a∗(g′, δ′, B))pi∆(dδ′)) is non-negative and less than one. Hence for any g ∈ G and for any q ≤ q′,
T ∗B [q](g) ≤ T ∗B [q′](g) and T ∗[q+a](g) = AB(g)+β
∫
G CB(g
′)q(g′)piG(dg′|g)+β
∫
G CB(g
′)q(g′)piG(dg′|g)a ≤
AB(g)+β
∫
G CB(g
′)q(g′)piG(dg′|g)+βa = T ∗B [q](g)+βa. Therefore T ∗B is a contraction by Blackwell suffi-
cient conditions, see Stokey et al. [1989], moreover its modulus is given by β which does not depend on B.
Part 2. Consider C ≡ βλEpi∆ [δ]1−β such that |q(g)| ≤ C, then
|T ∗B [q](g)| ≤ |AB(g)|+ βC ≤ βλEpi∆ [δ] + βC = βλEpi∆ [δ]{1 +
β
1− β } = βλEpi∆ [δ]
1
1− β , (E.65)
so in fact T ∗B maps functions bounded by C into themselves; and this holds for any B ∈ B. Thus the
fixed point of T ∗B also satisfies the inequality.
Part 3. Since piG(·|g) are constant with respect to g it follows that
P∗0 (g,B) = λβ
∫
G×∆
a∗(g′, δ′, B)δ′pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′) + β
∫
G
(
1− λ
∫
∆
a∗(g′, δ′, B)pi∆(dδ′)
)
P∗0 (g′, B)piG(dg′)
and thus P∗0 (g,B) is constant with respect to g, abusing notation we denote it as P∗0 (B). From the
display above it follows that
P∗0 (B) =
λβ
∫
G×∆ a
∗(g′, δ′, B)δ′pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′)
1− β ∫G (1− λ ∫∆ a∗(g′, δ′, B))pi∆(dδ′))piG(dg′) =
λβ
∫
G×∆ a
∗(g′, δ′, B)δ′pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′)
1− β + βλ (∫G ∫∆ a∗(g′, δ′, B)pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′)) .
Since δ ∈ ∆ is such that δ ≤ 1, |P∗0 (B)| ≤
λβ(
∫
G
∫
∆
a∗(g′,δ′,B)pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′))
1−β+βλ(
∫
G
∫
∆
a∗(g′,δ′,B)pi∆(dδ′)piG(dg′))
≤ βλ1−β+βλ < 1.
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E.2 Derivation of Equation 5.23
In this setting, to default or not, boils down to choosing a T (contingent on ω∞) such that for all
t < T (ω∞) there is no default and for t ≥ T (ω∞) there is financial autarky. Recall that under our
assumptions u(c, l) = c+H(l) and gt ∼ iidpiG, also piG has a density with respect to Lebesgue, which we
denote as fpiG .
For any ωt ∈ Ωt and t ≤ T (ω∞),
V ∗1 (gt, Bt(ω
t−1)) = max
(n,B′)∈Γ(gt,Bt(ωt−1),1)
n− g +H(1− n) + β
∫
{g′:g′≤g¯(B′)}
{V ∗1 (g′, B′)− V ∗0 (g′)}piG(dg′)
+ β
∫
V ∗0 (g
′)piG(dg′)
and let νt(ω
t) is the Lagrange multiplier of the restriction, z(1, n, gt) + P∗1 (B′)B′ − Bt(ωt−1) ≥ 0. By
assumption, the solution of B′ is in the interior. So the optimal choice ((nt(ωt))∞t=0, (Bt+1(ω
t))∞t=0) satisfy
1−H ′(1− nt(ωt)) + νt(ωt)
(
dz(1, nt(ω
t), gt)
dn
)
= 0
or equivalently
νt(ω
t) ≡ ν(nt(ωt)) = − 1−H
′(1− nt(ωt))
1−H ′(1− nt(ωt)) +H ′′(1− nt(ωt))nt(ωt) , (E.66)
and
νt(ω
t)
{
P∗1 (Bt+1(ωt)) +
dP∗1 (Bt+1(ωt))
dBt+1
Bt+1(ω
t)
}
=β
d
∫
{g′:g′≤g¯(Bt+1(ωt))}{V ∗1 (g′, Bt+1(ωt))− V ∗0 (g′)}piG(dg′)
dBt+1
=β
∫
{g′:g′≤g¯(Bt+1(ωt))}
dV ∗1 (g
′, Bt+1(ωt))
dBt+1
piG(dg
′)
+ β{V ∗1 (g¯(Bt+1(ωt)), Bt+1(ωt))− V ∗0 (g¯(Bt+1(ωt)))}fpiG(g¯(Bt+1(ωt)))
dg¯(Bt+1(ω
t))
dBt+1
.
Since V ∗1 (g¯(Bt+1(ω
t)), Bt+1(ω
t)) − V ∗0 (g¯(Bt+1(ωt))) = 0, the last term in the RHS is naught. Also,
dV ∗1 (gt,Bt(ω
t−1))
dBt
= νt(ω
t) and thus
νt(ω
t)
{
P∗1 (Bt+1(ωt)) +
dP∗1 (Bt+1(ωt))
dBt+1
Bt+1(ω
t)
}
= β
∫
{g′:g′≤g¯(Bt+1(ωt))}
νt+1(ω
t, g′)piG(dg′) (E.67)
We now show that ν is decreasing. For this it is easier to first establish that ν− ≡ 1/ν is increasing.
Observe that
ν−(n) = −1− H
′′(1− n)n
1−H ′(1− n)
and thus
dν−(n)
dn
= −−H
′′′(1− n)n+H ′′(1− n)
1−H ′(1− n) −
(H ′′(1− n))2n
(1−H ′(1− n))2 .
Since −H ′′′(1 − n)n + H ′′(1 − n) < 0 by assumption and 1 −H ′(1 − n) = τ > 0, then the first term in
the RHS is negative; the second term in the RHS is also negative. Hence ν− is increasing, which readily
implies that ν is decreasing.
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F Stylized Facts: Emerging vs. Industrialized Economies
Throughout the paper, we mention that our theoretical model is capable of replicating qualitatively
several stylized facts observed for a wide range of economies. In this section, we present these stylized
facts regarding the domestic government debt-to-output ratio and central government revenue-to-output
ratio of several countries: industrialized economies (IND), emerging economies (EME) and a subset of
these: Latin American (LAC).48
In the dataset set which covers the period 1800-2010, no default event is observed for IND, whereas
EME/LAC (LAC in particular) do exhibit several defaults. Thus, we take the former group as a proxy for
economies with access to risk-free debt and the latter group as a proxy for economies without commitment
to repay. It is worth to point out however that we are not presuming that IND economies are a type
of economy that would never never default. In turn, we are just using the fact that in our dataset IND
economies do not show default events, to use them as a proxy for the type of economy modeled in AMSS,
that is, one with risk-free government debt.
Several stylized facts that stand out in our dataset. First, in EME/LAC economies default is more
likely than in IND economies and within the former group, the default risk is much higher for highly
indebted economies. Second, EME and LAC economies exhibit tighter debt ceilings than IND, as also
reported by Reinhart et al. [2003]. Third, economies with higher default risk tend to exhibit more
volatile tax revenues than those with low default risk, and this fact is particularly notable for the group
of EME/LAC economies. Bauducco and Caprioli [2014] documents a similar finding.
As shown in section 5, our theory predicts that endogenous borrowing limits are more active for a
high level of indebtedness. That is, when the government debt is high relative to output, the probability
of default next period is higher, thus implying tighter borrowing limits and higher bond spreads. As the
government’s ability to smooth its needs for funds using debt is hindered, the volatility of taxes turns
out to be higher. But when debt is low, default is an unlikely event, thereby implying slacker borrowing
limits, lower spreads and therefore lower volatility in taxes. Hence, implications in the upper tail of
the domestic debt-to-output ratio distribution can be different from those in the “central part” of it.
Therefore, the mean and even the variance of the distribution may not be too informative, as they are
affected by the central part of the distribution. Quantiles are better suited for recovering the information
in the tails of the distribution.49
Figure F.10 plots the percentiles of the domestic government debt-to-output ratio and of a measure
of default risk for three groups: IND (black triangle), EME (blue square) and LAC (red circle).50 The
X-axis plots the time series averages of domestic government debt-to-output ratio, and the Y-axis plots
48For government revenue-to-output ratios, we used the data from Kaminsky et al. [2004], and for the domestic
government debt-to-output ratios, we used the data from Panizza [2008]. We thank Ugo Panizza and Carmen
Reinhart for kindly sharing their datasets with us. See appendix G for a detailed description of the data.
49We refer the reader to Koenker [2005] for a thorough treatment of quantiles and quantile-based econometric
models.
50This type of graph is not the conventional QQplot as the axis have the value of the random variable which
achieves a certain quantile and not the quantile itself. For our purposes, this representation is more convenient.
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Figure F.10: The percentiles of the domestic government debt-to-output ratio and of a measure
of default risk for three groups: IND (black triangle), EME (blue square) and LAC (red circle)
the values of the measure of default risk.51 For each group, the last point on the right corresponds
to the 95 percentile, the second to last to the 90 percentile and so on; these are comparable between
groups as all of them represent a percentile of the corresponding distribution. EME and LAC have
lower domestic debt-to-output ratio levels than IND; in fact the domestic debt-to-output ratio value of
around 50 percent that pertains to the 95 percentile for EME and LAC, corresponds roughly to only the
85 percentile for IND. Thus, economies that are prone to default (EME and LAC) exhibit tighter debt
ceilings than economies that do not default (in this dataset, represented by IND).
Figure F.10 also shows that for the IND group, the default risk measure is low and roughly constant
for different levels of debt-to-output ratios. On the other hand, the default risk measure for the EME
group is not only higher, but increases substantially for high levels of indebtness. We consider this as
evidence that for EME economies higher default risk is more prevalent for high levels of debt-to-output
ratios.
Table F(A) compares the measure of default risk between IND and EME for low and high debt-to-
output ratio levels. That is, for both groups (IND and EME) we select economies with debt-to-output
ratio below the 25th percentile (low debt-to-output) for which we compute the average risk measure.
We proceed analogously with those economies with debt-to-output ratio above the 75th percentile (high
51The measure of default risk is constructed as the spread using the EMBI+ real index from J.P. Morgan for
countries for which it is available and using the 3-7 year real government bond yield for the rest, minus the return
of a US Treasury bond of similar maturity. Although bond returns are not entirely driven by default risk but
also respond to other factors related to risk appetite, uncertainty and liquidity, for our purpose they constitute
a valid conventional proxy of default risk. Furthermore, our spreads are an imperfect measure of default risk for
domestic debt since EMBI+ considers mainly foreign debt. However, it is still informative since domestic default
are positively correlated with defaults on sovereign debt, at least for the period from 1950’s onwards. See figure
10 in Reinhart and Rogoff [2008].
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Table F.2: (A) Measure of default risk (%) for EME and IND groups for different levels of
debt-to-output ratio (%); (B) standard deviation of central government revenue over GDP (%)
for EME and IND groups for different levels of default risk.
(A) (B)
Debt/GDP EME IND Default Risk EME IND
25 5.4 2.0 25 0.9 1.4
75 10.7 2.9 75 2.5 1.7
debt-to-output). For the case of low debt-to-ouput levels, the EME group presents higher (approximately
twice as high) default risk than the IND group. For high debt-to-output ratio economies, however, this
difference is quadrupled. Thus, economies that are prone to default (EME and LAC) exhibit higher default
risk than economies that do not default (in this dataset, represented by IND), and, moreover, the default
risk is much higher for economies in the former group that have high levels of debt-to-output ratio.
Table F(B) compares the standard deviation of the central government revenue-to-output ratio be-
tween IND and EME for low and high default risk levels. It indicates that for IND there is little variation
of the volatility across low and high levels of default risk. For EME, however, the standard deviation
of the central government revenue-to-output ratio is dramatically higher for economies with high default
risk.52. It is worth pointing out that all the EME with high default risk levels defaulted at least once
during our sample period. Thus, economies with higher default risk exhibit more volatile tax revenues
than economies with low default risk. This is particularly notable for the group of EME/LAC economies.
These stylized facts establish a link between (a) default risk/default events, (b) debt ceilings and (c)
volatility of tax revenues. In particular, the evidence suggests that economies that show higher default
risk, also exhibit lower debt ceilings and more volatile tax revenues. The theory behind our model helps
shed light upon the forces driving these facts.53
G Description of the Data
In this section we describe how we constructed the figures presented in section F.
The industrialized economies group consists of AUSTRALIA (1990-1999), AUSTRIA (1990-1999),
BELGIUM (1990-2001), CANADA (1990-2003), DENMARK (1990-2003), FINLAND (1994-1998), FRANCE
(1990-2003), GERMANY (1990-1998), GREECE (1990-2001), IRELAND (1995-2003), ITALY (1990-
2003), JAPAN (1990-1993), NETHERLANDS (1990-2001), NEW ZEALAND (1990-2003), NORWAY
(1990-2003), PORTUGAL (1990-2001), SPAIN (1990-2003), SWEDEN (1990-2003), SWITZERLAND
(1990-2003), UNITED KINGDOM (1990-2003) and UNITED STATES (1990-2003).
The emerging economies group consists of ARGENTINA1 (1998-2003), BOLIVIA1 (2001-2003),
BRAZIL1 (1997-2003), CHILE1 (1993-2003), COLOMBIA1 (1999-2003), ECUADOR1 (1998-2003), EL
SALVADOR1 (2000-2003), HONDURAS1 (1990-2003), JAMAICA1 (1990-2003), MEXICO1 (1990-2003),
PANAMA1 (1997-2003), PERU1 (1998-2003), VENEZUELA1 (1997-2003), ALBANIA (1995-2003), BUL-
52We looked also at the inflation tax as a proxy for tax policy; results are qualitatively the same.
53It is important to note that we are not arguing any type of causality; we are just illustrating co-movements.
In fact, in the model below all three features are endogenous outcomes of equilibrium.
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GARIA (1991-2003), CYPRUS (1990-2003), CZECH REPUBLIC (1993-2003), HUNGARY (1991-2003),
LATVIA (1990-2003), POLAND (1990-2003), RUSSIA (1993-2003), TURKEY (1998-2003), ALGERIA
(1990-2003), CHINA (1997-2003), EGYPT (1993-2003), JORDAN (1990-2003), KOREA (1990-2003),
MALAYSIA (1990-2003), MAURITIUS (1990-2003), MOROCCO (1997-2003), PAKISTAN (1990-2003),
PHILIPPINES (1997-2003), SOUTH AFRICA (1990-2003), THAILAND (1999-2003) and TUNISIA
(1994-2003). The LAC group is conformed by the countries with “1”.
For section F we constructed the data as follows. First, for each country, we computed time average,
or time standard deviations or any quantity of interest (in parenthesis is the number of observations use
to construct these). Second, once we computed these averages, we group the countries in IND, EME
and LAC. We do this procedure for (a) central government domestic debt (as % of output) ; (b) central
government expenditure (as % of output) ; (c) central government revenue (as % of output) , and (d)
Real Risk Measure. The data for (a) is taken from Panizza [2008] ; the data for (b-c) is taken from
Kaminsky et al. [2004] ; finally the data for (d) is taken from www.globalfinancialdata.com.
For Greece and Portugal we use central government public debt because central government domestic
debt was not available. For Sweden, Ecuador and Thailand we use general government expenditure
because central government expenditure was not available. For Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Rep.,
Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Russia no measure of government expenditure was available and thus
were excluded from the sample for the calculations of this variable. The same caveats apply to the
central government revenue sample. For Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Morocco,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela we used the real EMBI+ as a measure
of real risk. For the rest of the countries we used government note yields of 1-5 years maturity, depending
on availability.
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